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This thesis describes the simulation of an integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system for adaptation of the functionality of digital distance relays enabling 
performance optimisation under changing power system conditions.
Protection relays should ensure the prompt, reliable, selective and economic removal 
o f the range o f fault scenarios possible on the power system. For unit protection 
schemes, the influence o f the state of the power system external to the protected unit 
is small and may be overcome by using bias settings. This is not so for non-unit forms 
of protection, essentially distance relays, where changes in the power system conditions 
may reduce the relay's performance considerably. The operating strategy of distance 
relays, by virtue of the zone settings and the characteristic shape, enables the protection 
to act as optimally as possible over a range of operating conditions. However, there 
are scenarios in which it is difficult to achieve optimal performance, the most notable 
being the influence of topological variations and high resistance earth faults. Here, it 
is beneficial to constantly change, or adapt, the functionality of the relay to ensure 
optimal operation. Adaptation may be achieved by a system that can monitor the state 
o f the power system, calculate the new relay functionality based on this information 
and update the relay.
The integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system provides a framework
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in which adaptation may be performed by exploiting advances in computer and 
communications technologies for the collation and dissemination of geographically 
distributed information. The integrated digital hierarchical control and protection 
system using apriori system information determines new settings and adjusts the 
characteristic to ensure optimum performance.
A simulation of the North Wales 400kV Supergrid Transmission Network provides the 
basis for a comparison of the performance of protection relays using fixed settings and 
characteristics against their adaptive counterparts using information derived via a 
hierarchical structure. The performance has been established with particular emphasis 
placed on the influence of variations in source capacity, topology, pre-fault loading and 
earth fault resistance.
The benefits and limitations o f integrated digital hierarchical control and protection 
systems relative to alternative solutions are discussed. The practical requirements for 
the introduction of an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system to 
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A total number of system faults,
a proportion of line from the relaying point to the fault.
C1 ((1 " a )*Z il Zgni)/ (Zmi +  Zjj +  Z^).
c0 (0  " a)*Zio +  Zsn0)/ (ZgjjjQ +  Z,0 +  Zm0).
C current cost.
Dp dependability Index.
Eml positive phase sequence voltage of source M.
positive phase sequence voltage of source N.
F future cost of finance.
?! number of faults where there was a failure to trip the circuit breaker.
F2 number of system faults on which there was unwanted system operation,
h ratio of sending end generator terminal voltage to receiving end
generator terminal voltage / EJ. 
i rate (eg: interest rate or rate of increase in cost o f operation and
maintenance).
11 3 the fault current flowing in feeder Z 1 3 from busbar 1 to busbar 3.
11 4 the fault current flowing in feeder Z 1 4 from busbar 1 to busbar 4.
the fault current flowing in feeder Z^ from busbar 3 to busbar 4.
I3  the fault current from the generator at busbar 3.
I4 2  the fault current flowing in feeder from busbar 4 to busbar 2.
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I „  Ib,Ic a-phase, b-phase, c-phase line currents.
IA 0  zero phase sequence current flowing in feeder A between busbars A and
B.
Iai positive phase sequence current flowing in feeder A between busbars A
and B.
IA 2  negative phase sequence current flowing in feeder A between busbars
A and B.
Ico zero phase sequence current flowing in feeder C between busbars A and
B.
I C 1  positive phase sequence current flowing in feeder C between busbars A
and B.
Ic2  negative phase sequence current flowing in feeder C between busbars
A and B.
IAT the fault current flowing in feeder ZAT from busbar A to busbar T.
ICT the fault current flowing in feeder ZbT from busbar C to busbar T.
If fault current (=  In + Ir +  Ir)-
I ro zero phase sequence fault current.
I fl positive phase sequence fault current.
In negative phase sequence fault current.
Ilu! pre-fault positive phase sequence a-phase load current.
m^easured measured current at relaying point.






















fault current flowing from busbar N to the fault point F.
I. +  Ib +  Ic.
(Zjo ■ ZjiVS.Zu.
number of years.
amount borrowed (present worth), 
annual capital recovery cost, 
fault resistance, 
security index.
argument of the earth fault impedance factor, Zrf or the difference in
angle between two busbar voltages.
throttling or infeed ratio.
pre-fault voltage at the fault point.
a-phase, b-phase, c-phase line voltages.
measured voltage at relaying point.
admittance matrix.
[Yreduced! reduced admittance matrix equivalent to [Y].
km
sub-matrix of [Y]. 
sub-matrix of [Y]. 
sub-matrix of [Y]. 
sub-matrix of [Y].
elements of admittance matrix, [Y ], where k and m are integers 
representing the rows and columns of the matrix respectively.
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Equivalent to admittance between k and m (=  Gfan +  Bkm)*
[Z] impedance matrix.
2 ^  elements of impedance matrix, [Z], where k and m are integers
representing the rows and columns of the matrix respectively.
Z 1 3 impedance of transmission line from busbar 1 to busbar 3.
Z 1 4 impedance of transmission line from busbar 1 to busbar 4.
Z2 4  impedance of transmission line from busbar 2 to busbar 4.
Z3 4  impedance of transmission line from busbar 3 to busbar 4.
^AT impedance of the transmission line from busbar A to the throttling point
T.
ZBX impedance of the transmission line from busbar B to the throttling point
T.
Zj line impedance.
Zn positive phase sequence line impedance.
Zjq zero phase sequence line impedance.
m^easured measured impedance by a distance relay.
Zrf earth fault impedance factor.
ZnjQ zero phase sequence mutual impedance between the faulted and
unfaulted transmission line.
Zml positive phase sequence impedance of source M.
Z^jo zero phase sequence impedance of source M.
Zml positive phase sequence impedance of source N.
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zero phase sequence impedance o f source N.
Ztf positive phase sequence impedance of transformer.
Zzooe i 2 0 0 6  1  setting of distance relay.
Za** 2  zone 2  setting of distance relay.




ACC Area Control Centre
A I Artificial Intelligence
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator
CB Circuit Breaker
CCT Critical Clearing Time
CNU Communications Network Unit
CT Current Transformer
DAU Data Acquisition Unit
DCU Data Communications Unit
EBU Emergency Back Up
EHV Extra High Voltage
EMI Electromagnetic Interference.
EMS Energy Management System
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FGT Full Graphics Terminal
HV High Voltage
IEE Institution of Electrical Engineers
IEEE Institution of Electronic and Electrical Engineers
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
ISO International Standards Organsiation
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LAN Local Area Network
LV Low Voltage
METRO Micro Enhanced Telecommand Remote Outstation
NCC National Control Centre
NGC National Grid Company
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PDS Program Development System
REF Restricted Earth Fault
RTU Remote Terminal Unit.
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisistion







1.1.1 Motivation and Objectives of Research
Power system operators are increasingly required to respond to changes in a fast, efficient, 
flexible and economic manner whilst maintaining the integrity o f the complex systems they 
operate. Nowhere is this more relevant than in the United Kingdom following the 
privatisation o f the electricity supply industry in 1991. Within this framework electrical 
utilities are asking themselves a number of pertinent questions.
•  How can the services that the power utility provide, both internally and 
externally, be improved and the operation o f the network be optimised ?
•  How can the resources o f the power utility be utilised to their best
advantage ?
•  How can all the different aspects o f the power utility business be assessed
in order that fast, correct decisions can be made ?
•  How can the power utility respond to change ?
•  How can potential problems be identified and corrected ?
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Against this background, new technologies, especially in computing (microprocessors) 
and digital communications, are developing rapidly. A wide range of microprocessor- 
based devices are now commercially available for power system monitoring, control and 
relaying. Microprocessor technology solutions have attractive benefits over alternative 
methodologies including reduced power requirements, reduced space requirements, 
sophisticated signal analysis, self-monitoring ability, flexibility, enhanced operator 
interfaces and comprehensive data storage and retrieval ability.
In parallel with the evolution of the microprocessor, there have been significant advances 
in digital communications technology. Fibre optic communications links have been 
developed that are immune to electro-magnetic interference (EMI), avoid the need for 
electronic signal repeaters and complex switching arrangements, and have a high 
bandwidth and low attenuation. The requirements for reliable and high performance 
communications channels for data transfer and control in power systems, especially under 
faulted network conditions, give fibre optic communications links significant potential.
New tools and concepts that exploit the greater flexibility and efficiency provided by 
microprocessor and communications technology have also emerged. Early 
microprocessor-based devices had largely been produced to perform a single or related 
range of tasks without the assistance of other devices. Whilst these devices were stand­
alone and acted autonomously within a business or process, the realisation that the 
information used or generated at one stage may be useful at another, for say performance
27
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enhancement, became apparent. This resulted in the interconnection o f autonomous 
computers via communications media and became known as the computer network. A 
number o f topological variations for the configuration o f computer networks have 
emerged, one o f which is hierarchical and forms the basis for the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system. There have also been considerable 
developments in the rules and conventions by which computers access the network and 
communicate with one another.
The computer network is increasingly being used for factory and office automation, 
providing a framework for the collation and dissemination of information. The 
widespread availability o f up-to-date information on any requested aspect o f the operation 
or process enables.
•  Provision of a better service to customers that is in line with changing 
market requirements.
•  Optimised performance achieved via planning, forecasting and quality 
assessment tools.
•  Improved access to strategic information and quality o f supply.
•  Maximum utilisation of available resources.
•  Improved efficiency resulting in reduced cost.
•  Increased reliability o f supply.
•  Marked increases in levels o f automation.
28
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The computer software plays an important and integral part to the hardware. 
Developments in Computer Aided Software Engineering tools, database techniques, 
artificial intelligence and graphical user interfaces provide the user with considerable 
power in a user friendly environment.
This technology can provide answers to the questions posed at the beginning o f the 
section and has the potential for revolutionising power system control and protection. 
However, there are a number o f questions that the application o f this technology to power 
systems, as opposed to other processes, need addressing. These questions include not 
only the technical aspects but also the wider economic issues. In particular, there is a 
great deal o f concern regarding the reliability, security and costs o f implementation. To 
answer these questions, research has been undertaken at the University o f Bath, the 
objectives o f which are two-fold:
•  To simulate an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection 
system.
•  To evaluate the potential benefits and limitations of introducing such a 
system to the United Kingdom's North Wales 400 / 275 kV network.
1.1.2 History
Digital computers have been applied to the power industry since their introduction. They
29
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have been used for analysis, monitoring, control and protection o f the power system. 
Initial research concentrated on the development o f mathematical models for the 
numerical representation of power systems on the computer. Off-line analysis techniques 
for load flow analysis [1.1, 1.2], transient [1.3, 1.4] and dynamic [1.5, 1.6] stability 
analysis, and security assessment [1.7, 1.8] were developed. These calculations were 
performed on mainframe computers or mini-computers, consuming large amounts o f 
power and requiring big, air-conditioned storage space. Towards the end o f the 1960s 
and during the early 1970s microprocessor-based systems, supported by digital 
communication systems, emerged. The availability o f reliable, small, cheap 
microprocessors was to pave the way for considerable developments in power system 
monitoring, control and protection [1.9, 1.10].
The application o f digital techniques for the protection o f power systems was first 
proposed by Rockefeller [1.11] in 1969. The feasibility and concepts o f protecting 
equipment within a substation using a single computer, together with requirements and 
problems, were outlined. With the exception o f this work, initial research concentrated 
on the replacement of conventional stand-alone protection relays with digital equivalents 
having similar, if  not better, functionality. Mann and Morrison [1.12, 1.13] developed a 
digital computer-based distance-type protection suitable for protection o f transmission 
lines. Using a sample and derivative technique it was possible to estimate the current and 
voltage phasors from sampled data and determine the impedance. This work was 
extended by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the Pacific Gas and Electric
30
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Company [1.14, 1.15] and after field trials resulted in the first practical application.
Hope and Umamaheswaran [1.16] recognised the importance o f analysis o f the sampled 
data in the frequency domain and developed a number o f techniques for impedance 
measurement using orthogonal filters. As digital signal processing techniques were 
developed in conjunction with the reduced cost o f hardware a multitude o f papers started 
to emerge [1.17, 1.18, 1.19].
Digital techniques have also been applied to load shedding and load restoration functions. 
These require the measurement o f power system frequency and rate of change o f 
frequency. Methods were based on the zero-crossing instant o f the voltage waveform 
[1.20], Fourier Transform Analysis [1.21, 1.22] and filtering techniques [1.23, 1.24]. 
Whilst these techniques remain the basis for the determination o f power system frequency, 
the inherent errors o f each methodology have been reduced by the incorporation o f 
filtering methodologies [1.25, 1.26].
Digital techniques for generator [1.27, 1.28], transformer [1.29], transmission line [1.30] 
and multi-terminal transmission line [1.31, 1.32, 1.33] differential schemes have emerged. 
These schemes have the added complexity that measuring parameters are derived from 
two or more different points on the power system, that may have completely different 
geographical locations requiring more than one microprocessor unit and a 
communications link across which signals must be correlated.
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The requirements for information exchange between computers added a new dimension 
to electrical communications culminating in developments in digital communications and 
the computer network [1.34,1.35]. In the 1980s, the combination o f computer and digital 
communications technology was applied to the electric utility market and saw the 
emergence of control centres with Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCAD A) 
systems [1.9]. In their simplest form, SCADA systems enabled the gathering o f data, the 
displaying o f information and the control o f selected elements. The SCADA system 
comprised a master computer and a number of remote terminal units (RTUs). The master 
computer could interrogate the RTUs, via a communications link, enabling the provision 
o f on-line data gathering. This information enabled the power system operator to have 
a better understanding o f the current status of the system and using this information, if  
necessary, issue control actions to plant, via the SCADA system, including:
•  Open / close circuit breaker.
•  Change tap setting of transformer (up / down).
•  Reset relays.
•  Change automatic voltage regulators (AVRs) operation (manual /
automatic).
More recently, the functionality of SCADA systems have been enhanced to include 
Automatic Generation Control, Energy Management System (EMS), Distribution 
Management Systems, Load Management System, Automatic Meter Reading and
32
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Automatic Mapping / Facilities Management Systems.
In addition to the use of digital computers and communications links for power system 
control, applications have been developed for protection. Digital tele-protection systems 
[1.36] enabled communications links between relays providing signal conditioning, data 
encoding / decoding and error detection. These enable the reliable, real-time transfer of 
information, such as the Direct Transfer Trip in protection signalling.
Until the 1970s monitoring, control and protection functions had been kept independent. 
In the conventional substation there were high levels of wiring to the control room, and 
duplication of instrumentation and measurement transducers. However, computers now 
had the ability to easily communicate with one another. This technology made the 
integration of monitoring, control and protection information possible, with the incentive 
to overcome limitations of the conventional substation. In the United States o f America, 
the Houston Lighting and Power Company, in conjunction with the Electric Power 
Institute o f Texas A & M University, developed and installed an integrated control, 
monitoring and protection system known as the Feeder Protection and Monitoring System 
[1.37, 1.38]. The system provided integrated feeder monitoring, fault data acquisistion, 
arcing fault detection and protection. The utilities experience based on field tests and 
subsequent use o f the system highlighted the benefits gained by the availability o f 
additional information and improved performance [1.39].
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Westinghouse ABB T&D, sponsored by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 
expanded on this by developing a totally integrated substation. They demonstrated the 
feasibility o f introducing an integrated digital system for the protection, control and 
monitoring within a substation [1.40, 1.41, 1.42] by developing a system known as 
WESPAC. The system provided transmission line, bus and transformer protection relaying 
together with benefits gained by using integrated systems. The integrated environment 
enabled optimisation o f the performance o f the protection and control functions and 
provided additional support functions, using locally available information, within the 
substation.
In Japan, Takak et-al [1.43] initially exploited the technology by developing an intra­
station optical fibre data transmission system for power system control and protection. 
More recently, Suzuki, Matsuda, Ohashi, and Sano [1.44] developed a substation digital 
protection and control system using a fibre optic local area network (LAN). Field tests 
were undertaken in an Extra High Voltage (EHV) substation over the period o f a year and 
highlighted the immunity o f such systems to EMI.
Concurrently with the developments in digital computer and communications technology 
there have been developments in the concepts of monitoring, control and protection of 
power systems. These have evolved as increasing knowledge o f the performance 
requirements of power systems have emerged by improved analytical techniques and the 
availability o f actual power system performance data. The need to avoid protection relay
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mal-operation and ensure continuing optimal relay operation, has led to the concept of 
adaptive protection relaying which has been defined by Horowitz et-al [1.45]:
"Adaptive protection is a protection philosophy which permits and seeks to make 
adjustments to various protection functions in order to make the system more 
attuned to power system conditions"
Adaptive protection enables the relay to have a superior performance to existing 
conventional protection relays. Horowitz et-al [1.45] described the potential benefits and 
principles o f adaptive techniques for transmission systems. The application o f adaptive 
techniques to reliability, multi-terminal transmission line protection, transformer 
protection, relay setting and automatic reclosing were described. The superior 
performance of the adaptive protection relays was achieved by supplying the devices with 
additional information. Two schools of thought as to how this information was to be 
derived emerged.
The first school o f thought followed a more conventional approach. Moore [1.46] 
developed a discrete stand-alone adaptive distance relay provided with the traditional 
input measurands o f its conventional equivalent counterpart. By more detailed analysis 
o f the existing information in the form of the traditional current and voltage input 
measurands at the relaying point, using enhanced signal processing techniques and 
adaptive filter theory, improved earth fault coverage and resistance to power swings was
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achieved. More recently Wiszniewski and Kasztenny [1.47] developed an adaptive 
transformer differential relay with improved reliability in which the decision to operate was 
formulated using fuzzy set theory. Fitton et-al [1.48], using a neural network approach, 
developed an auto-reclose relay that optimised the time to reclosure by adapting to the 
time for extinction o f the secondary arc within the circuit breaker. The use, by these 
systems, of only the traditional input measurements has both benefits and limitations. One 
of the more marked limitations is that they used only the limited information available at 
the relaying point. This limits the performance enhancements possible.
The second school o f thought, addressing this limitation, supplied the relay with additional 
information relating to the current status of the entire power system. Rockefeller et-al 
[1.49] described how a simple impedance model of the power system, with up-to-date 
parameters relating to the current power system conditions was capable o f improving 
protection reliability and maximising utilisation of the transmission system. Using this 
approach, Xia et-al [1.50] proposed a distance relay that adapted its characteristic to 
optimise its performance under the influence of high resistance earth faults. In its simplest 
form, the additional information was derived from a central computer monitoring the 
status of the system and providing the relays with updated impedance model parameters. 
Phadke [1.10] described a computer integrated approach, similar to the WESPAC system, 
more applicable to the large power systems of today.
The speed o f operation, inherent self-monitoring capability and ability to form part o f
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integrated monitoring, control and protection systems now make digital relays an 
attractive alternative to their analogue and electro-mechanical equivalents. With the 
integrity o f the power system closely correlated with the performance o f the protection 
system coupled with the need for flexible, economic, reliable, highly utilised and easily 
managed systems, there is an incentive to consider the potential benefits that the additional 
functionality available through the introduction o f integrated systems can give. The 
application of digital technology is increasingly being used in new substations. However, 
nowhere has integration of the protection system distributed over a wide geographical 
area taken place and it is this area that the research seeks to address.
1 . 2  Structure of Thesis
A brief description o f the structure o f the thesis is outlined.
By way o f introduction, Chapter 2 describes the transmission system o f the United 
Kingdom by considering the three main sub-systems of which it is made: the power plant, 
the control system and the protection system. The principles behind each of the sub­
systems and the current technology employed are outlined. This provides an 
understanding o f the current transmission system to enable an appreciation o f the issues 




Chapter 3 outlines the concepts associated with computer integrated system. The 
alternative computer network architectures, together with the benefits and limitations o f 
each network, are reviewed. It is shown that a computer integrated system with the 
computing resources arranged hierarchically provides the environment for the collation 
and dissemination o f information in large, complex systems such as those o f power 
systems for performing integrated control and protection. The application o f the 
computer integrated system to power systems in the form an integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system is introduced.
Chapter 4 outlines the necessity for the introduction of integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection systems. The limitations o f conventional protection systems are 
outlined. This highlights the need for optimisation o f the relay functionality under the 
influence o f changing power system operating conditions and leads to the concept o f 
adaptive protection.
Two principle methods o f relay adaptation are available: setting adaptation and 
characteristic adaptation. Chapter 5 describes the principles and use o f the hierarchical 
control and protection system for the adaptation o f the protection relay setting. The 
settings are performed using a reduced impedance model, located in the substation, whose 
parameters are continually updated to reflect the current power system conditions. A 
number of strategies for the adaptive setting of protection relays, including a novel method 
which sets the relay by analysing the performance o f a setting in terms o f dependability
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and security, are presented. Results of the performance o f a number the adaptive settings 
relative to the performance of the actual settings for relays within the North Wales 400 
/ 275 kV network are presented. The chapter is concluded by outlining the limitations in 
the adaptive setting of distance relays.
Chapter 6 describes the principles and use o f the hierarchical control and protection 
system for adapting the characteristic of distance relays, again using a reduced impedance 
model with up-to-date parameters. The influence o f power system parameters on the 
measured impedance by distance relays subjected to a-phase to earth faults with varying 
fault resistance is presented. It is shown that characteristic adaptation enables substantial 
improvements in performance relative to conventional distance relay characteristics.
Chapter 7 discusses the computer simulations developed to illustrate the benefits and 
limitations o f the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system relative to 
conventional systems. Two applications, that operate in a Microsoft Windows 3.1 
environment, are described. The first application simulates a hierarchical control and 
protection system for the adaptive setting of distance relays and enables comparison o f the 
performance of adaptively set relays, subject to the various setting algorithms, and 
conventional stand-alone relays. The second simulation enables comparison o f the 
performance of the residually compensated a-phase to earth element o f a relay with an 




Chapter 8 outlines the benefits and limitations o f the integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection system relative to alternative solutions. Initially qualitative arguments are 
used to illustrate the benefits and limitations o f the integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection system. These are then quantified simplistically in economic terms and it 
is shown that, in the long term, investment in the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system, as opposed to other alternatives, is beneficial.
The practical requirements for the introduction of an integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection system to the grid system within the United Kingdom are outlined in 
Chapter 9. Initially, the steps necessary in the introduction o f the system, including 
feasibility study, requirements analysis, design and implementation, are outlined. Using 
the existing system as a basis, an evolutionary approach to the realisation o f the integrated 
digital hierarchical control and protection system is described. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting further developments in technology required, and some o f the social issues 
necessary for consideration, in the introduction o f the integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system.
Chapter 10 concludes the report and outlines proposals for future work.
It should be noted that all figures and tables associated with a chapter are presented at the 
end of the respective chapter. The references in each chapter are detailed in Chapter 11. 






The electricity supply system of the United Kingdom is one o f the largest and most highly 
integrated in the world. The electricity supply system, in its most abstract form, may 
conveniently be divided into three main subsystems: generation, transmission and 
distribution [2.1]. Generating stations are located in areas o f high amenity which may 
have geographical positions that differ from load centres. The transmission network 
interconnects generating plant and enables the bulk transfer o f electricity to load centres. 
The distribution system supplies this energy to the individual consumer. Each o f the three 
subsystems (ie: generation, transmission and distribution) may further be decomposed, 
Fig.2.1, into the power subsystem responsible for the physical transfer o f electricity, the 
control subsystem responsible for controlling the transfer o f electricity and the protection 
system responsible for protecting the system.
To provide a framework upon which to discuss the research, this chapter outlines the 
means and principles used for the supply of electricity, and the control and protection of 
the power system of today. Whilst the generation, transmission and distribution systems 
each play an important and integral role in the supply o f electricity, this research has
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concentrated on the transmission system and the discussion will be restricted to this.
2.2 Power Plant in the UK Grid System
The transmission system o f the United Kingdom performs two main functions: 
interconnection to allow the pooling of generation on a national basis, and the bulk 
transfer o f electricity from generating stations to load centres [2.2]. This enables 
economic power generation, security o f supply, reduction in spinning reserve, reduction 
in margin, and resource availability and demand. To facilitate the economic and reliable 
supply o f electricity to the customer [2.3], a system that has become known as the grid 
is used. The concept o f the grid system is simplistically illustrated in Fig.2.2.a. 
Transmission lines are joined together at substations or nodes. Each node is capable of 
having generating plant and / or load connected to it. In addition, transmission lines may 
be switched in and out o f service. Nodes where loads and generating plant are not 
connected are known as marshalling points. Should there be loss of a line, Fig.2.2.b, due 
to a fault or maintenance projects, supply may be maintained via alternative routes thus 
improving the system security. Power transmission on the grid system is conducted at 400 
kV and 275 kV, the dimensions of power plant on the system being tabulated in Table 2.1. 
The operation o f the power plant on the system is controlled by a comprehensive system 
that forms the subject of the following section. Faulted plant is removed from service by 
protection devices which are discussed in section 2.4.
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2.3 Power System Control in the UK Grid System
2.3.1 Introduction
Control o f the National Grid Company (NGC) power system is achieved by an EMS that 
came on-line in May 1994. Control o f the power system, and of generators of 
despatchable size, is effected through the National Control Centre (NCC) at Wokingham 
and four Area Control Centres (ACCs) at Bristol, Birminham, Coventry and Leeds, 
Fig.2.3 [2.5], A standby NCC is located in St. Albans, London that is also used for 
Dispatcher Training. This arrangement is hierarchical with NCC responsible for overall 
control o f the NGC system and for the co-ordination o f the ACCs. The ACCs provide, 
and are responsible for, detailed control within their respective regions.
2.3.2 Control Centre Computers
At each control centre, a fully dual redundant computer system is installed providing on­
line SCADA, animated wall diagrams, graphical visual display units, data storage and 
power system analysis applications. The system, Fig.2.4, comprising three Cyber 180-960 
computers, are arranged as a redundant pair (Main 1 and Main 2) and an Emergency Back 
Up (EBU) system. A fourth Cyber 180-830 computer is provided for software 
development, known as the Program Development System (PDS). In the normal mode 
of operation, both Main 1 and Main 2 provide EMS services. Should Main 1 be lost, the
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system automatically changes to Main 2 and vice-versa. Both Main 1 and Main 2 are 
capable o f providing all services on their own. Should both Main 1 and Main 2 fail, the 
EBU system is brought on-line manuallly.
The standby NCC at St. Albans, London has a Cyber 180-960. This is a full replicated 
system to the one provided at Wokingham. For operation, the computer must be loaded 
with the required software and database. Initialisation o f the system automatically re­
routes communications from Wokingham to St. Albans.
The individual Cyber computers are interfaced by duplicate Ethernet channels. A mass 
data storage disk, with twin magnetic tapes, is provided for back-up and historical data 
storage purposes. Communications between control centres is achieved via the 
Communications Network Units (CNUs), a microprocessor-based bus interfacing device. 
In a similar manner, the interface of power system operators to the system is undertaken 
via the Full Graphics Terminal (FGT); and the data aquisition from outstations at the 
control centre is undertaken by the Data Communication Units (DCUs). The CNU also 
provides the mechanism for interfacing to external devices, such as the wall diagrams, via 
Telecontrol Interface Equipment (TIE).
2.3.3 Outstations
The control centres monitor and control the power system via dual-ported Micro
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Enhanced Telecommand Remote Outstations (METROs). The METROs have analog and 
digital capability with input quantities from 0 to 10 mA. In monitoring the system, 
received data is scaled and time-tagged, althought the latter is not transmitted to the 
control centre. Comprehensive inter-locking between the control centre and the METRO 
provides reliable plant control.
2.3.4 Communications
A pyramidal communications network, Fig.2.5, has been implemented between the NCC 
and ACCs for power system monitoring and control. This communications system 
provides duplicate, separately routed channels between the NCC and the ACCs. This 
enables the NCC to communicate either directly with each of the ACCs or via an 
alternative ACC and a tie line. Data is exchanged between the control centres (either 
NCC to ACC or ACC to ACC) using CDCNET, a communications system provided by 
Control Data Corporation. CDCNET is a wide band communications systems based on 
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model. It carries the EMS Application 
Data Link (EMS Link) providing bi-directional communications between the control 
centres for SCADA, application program and other data transfer. CDCNET uses the 
NGC Corporate Communications Network, which links all major operational and 
corporate centres using Public Data Network Megastream links.
The control centres, via the DCUs, provide data paths to the METROs for acquistion o f
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measured analogue and digital power system status information. To ensure reliable 
communications duplicate, separately routed channels are used and connected to both the 
Main and EBU computers, Fig.2.6. The costs o f redundancy are reduced by using a 
triangulated approach, Fig.2.7. In a similar manner to the pyramidal communications 
network between control centres, this provides duplicate channels to each outstation, one 
o f which is direct, and the other via an alternative outstation in the same geographical 
region and tie line. Communications between the control centres and the outstations uses 
the GI74 protocol at 300 bd. This protocol allows regular transmission of analogue 
measurements, which are scanned about once a second. Digital status changes interrupt 
the analogue scanning on occurence for transmission of this information.
2.3.5 EMS Functionality and Tools
The EMS incorporates comprehensive tools for the monitoring, analysis and control o f 
the power system. These tools include data configuration, display and power system 
analysis, all o f which enable the operator to more optimally control the power system.
The power system operator can request the on-line transfer o f any parameter within the 
system. All analogue data can be checked for limit violations. Historic data for 10 days 
of power system operation is available on disc and comprehensive retrospective and on­
line data analysis facilities are provided. The system has comprehensive event handling 
and disturbance data collection functions.
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A wall diagram provides an overview of the system showing, circuit status, substation 
splits, reference time, frequency and inter-area flows. Alarm and telephone annunciation 
are also displayed. Colour graphics terminals provide high resolution display o f the power 
system configuration, with each console having the ability to support 4 terminals. 
Databases may be ammended and control may be exercised from each terminal, the level 
o f access being controlled by a master console which assigns individual terminals or 
groups o f terminals to have the required functionality. The terminals have the capability 
o f viewing the status o f the power system at different levels o f abstraction. In the most 
abstract form a whole national overview of the system can be obtained. Alternatively 
sections o f the system or detailed configurations o f substations can be displayed.
Power system analysis applications can be performed concurrently with the on-line 
monitoring and control o f the system. Tools include topology checking, analogue state 
estimation, security analysis, load flow analysis and optimal power flow solutions.
2.4 Power System Protection in the UK Grid System
2.4.1 Introduction
Power plant is protected by protection relays. To ensure high fault detection reliability, 
protection equipment is arranged such that any system fault is detected by at least two 
independent protective devices known as first main and second main protection, Fig.2.8.
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To minimise the risk of common-cause failures as much diversity should be introduced as 
possible. This should include, but not be limited to the use o f different protection 
principles, different signalling equipment and media, differently routed communications 
channels, and different equipment manufacturers. In addition, maximum diversity should 
be extended to the protection systems for parallel circuits. The protection philosophies 
for the different types of plant within the transmission system are briefly discussed. A 
knowledge of the types of protection available, and there concepts, is assumed.
2.4.2 Protection Equipment for Transmission Feeders [2 .6 ]
The type of protection used for the protection o f transmission feeders is governed by the 
circuit length and its configuration. For plain feeders, the first main protection is of unit 
type and the second main protection is normally a three / four zone distance relay. In 
some applications it is not possible to use unit schemes to perform the first main 
protection task. Here, distance protection is used. For cases where two distance 
protections are used, one should be of the blocked type and the other of the accelerated 
trip type if  possible.
For transformer feeders, as with plain feeders, first and second main protection are 
required at both ends of the feeder. The first main protection is provided by some form 
o f unit protection or distance protection and the second main protection by a distance 
scheme. In some applications, there is insufficient fault current at the transformer end to
48
Chapter 2: Background
initiate the protection. This is overcome by employing unit schemes on the transformer 
and either a unit or distance scheme on the line.
For teed feeder applications, i f  there is access to the tee-point for installation o f current 
transformers (CTs) and / or voltage transformers (VTs), then each leg o f the circuit is 
protected as a plain feeder and a circulating current zone using differential schemes is 
established at the tee-point. An intertripping arrangement is required to ensure clearance 
o f faults initiated by protection located at the tee-point. By paralleling current 
transformers at the tee-point, the cost o f one set o f CTs can be saved at the expense o f 
reduced accuracy in the protection. For applications where the tee-point is not accessable 
to measurement transducers, a unit protection scheme provides the first main protection 
and a distance scheme providing second main protection are employed.
2.4.3 Protection Equipment for Transformers [2.7, 2.8, 2.9]
For two winding transformers, a differential protection scheme is normally used for the 
first main protection. Restricted earth fault (REF) protection provides the second main 
protection. Auto-transformers are protected by a circulating current differential 
protection scheme providing the first main protection and overcurrent protection 
providing the alternative second main protection. Both two winding transformers and 
auto-transformers have winding temperature protection and Buckoltz protection. These 
incorporate alarm and trip facilities.
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2.4.4 Protection Equipment for Busbars [2.10]
Busbars are not inherently protected in the power system, and as such require their own 
protection schemes. The first main protection is provided by a frame earth or differential 
protection scheme. Backup protection is provided by remote distance protection.
2.4.5 Protection Equipment for C ircuit Breaker Failure [2.11]
Circuit breakers may fail to trip when instructed to do so. Circuit breaker failure is 
detected by a current check relay which continuously monitors the circuit load, but whose 
output contacts are only permitted to operate following the operation of the circuit trip 
relays. On operation o f the current check relay contacts, a time delay is initiated which 
on expiration w ill initiate the tripping of remote circuit breakers to clear the fault (first 
main protection). In a similar manner to busbar protection, the back-up protection 
function is performed by remote distance protection.
2.4.6 Protection Equipment for Series Reactors and Shunt Compensation Plant 
[2.7]
Series reactors are protected by their own circulating current differential protection 
scheme or included within the protection zone of other protection (first main protection). 
For applications where the reactor is connected directly to the busbar, it must be included
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in the station busbar protection zone. Overcurrent protection, located on each side of the 
reactor, provides back-up (second main protection) protection. Shunt compensation 
reactors must always be protected by their own circulating current differential protection 
scheme providing the first main protection. Overcurrent protection, with a residually 
compensated centre element, provides back-up protection for shunt compensation reactors 
(second main protection). Operation o f protection must ensure intertripping o f all circuit 
breakers capable o f providing fault infeeds to either the series or shunt compensated 
reactor. Both series and shunt reactors have winding temperature protection and 
Buckoltz protection.
2.4.7 Protection Equipment for Quadrature Boosters [2.7]
Quadrature boosters are protected by a circulating current differential protection scheme 
having three sets o f current transfomers located on the incoming connections, outgoing 
connections and the neutral end o f the HV winding of the shunt regulating transformer 
(first main protection). Overcurrent relays provide back-up protection (second main 
protection). Winding temperature and Buckoltz protection is provided.
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Table 2.1: Dimensions o f the UK Transmission System [2.4]
400 kV transmission lines 8417 circuit kilometers
275 kV transmission lines 4386 circuit kilometers
Number o f Transformers 531
Number o f Substations 194
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Figure 2.2 Principle of the Grid System
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Figure 2.8 General Illustration of the Concepts of Protecting Power Plant




During the first two decades of their existence, computers were large, highly centralised 
systems. Developments in microprocessor and communications technology during the 
1960s led to significant changes in the way computer systems were organised and the 
demise of the large single computer. This resulted from the ability o f the small 
microprocessor-based computer to be more easily placed next to the functions they were 
required to perform, ranging from small control and monitoring tasks to simple office 
tools. This enabled continued developments in the automation o f functions involved in 
the direct assembly o f commodities. However, it soon became apparent that the time 
taken to produce the 'physical' commodity, that had been benefitting from the automation 
o f functions, only formed a small proportion o f the entire process, the remainder of the 
time being accounted for by all the support functions required within the organisation. 
This realisation resulted in the development of tools for the automation of these support 
functions including not only payroll, sales, and design systems but also decision support 
systems. More importantly, it was recognised that central to the successful operation o f 
a business was the communications between all the different aspects o f the organisation. 
The successful business efficiently integrated [3.1, 3.2] all the different aspects of its
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business to respond to the market demands, produce better quality products, reduce costs, 
enhance performance, and maximise asset utilisation. For businesses to fully exploit the 
benefits o f automation, this required not only the automation o f functions but also the 
automation o f how these functions were integrated. The computer, with its ability to 
easily form part of a computer network, formed the framework by which integration was 
to occur and led to the computer integrated system. These systems integrate the concepts 
from areas such as control, identification, estimation, communication theory, operational 
research, computer science and artificial intelligence to achieve this. The computer 
integrated system provides assistance, control and automation at all levels, and enables 
integration o f all aspects o f the business.
3.2 Structure of the Computer Integrated System
In its simplest form, a computer integrated system may be effected by a central computer, 
Fig.3.1 monitoring the business via sensors, using this information to calculate the 
required control actions necessary to optimise the performance of the business, and 
communicating these actions to the actuators. However as the system size increases, to 
analyze, control and optimise large centrally controlled systems in real time becomes 
impractical as the instrumentation, communication and computation requirements are too 
great. Issues o f system reliability and integrity become increasingly important. Should 
the computer system fail, the entire system fails. Should the process require expansion, 
large programs require updating without introducing errors. Should problems arise in the
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software, trouble-shooting is difficult. Service requests are answered sequentially and 
when the computer is used to handle thousands o f input and output requests, the speed 
at which the necessary control tasks are performed may be unacceptable and may result 
in integrity degradation.
An alternative approach is to decompose the centralised computing resource into a 
number of smaller decentralised computing resources, with each decentralised computer 
located next to the task or group of tasks it is required to monitor and control, Fig.3.2. 
In such a system, devices only have to feed their information back to their local computer. 
The decentralised computers democratically exchange information, to optimise the 
performance o f the tasks they are required to perform, by communicating with one 
another. The decentralised computer system goes some way in alleviating the problems 
o f the single centralised computer. Should one o f the decentralised computers fail, the 
offending device can be isolated such that the remainder o f the system is not affected. In 
some cases it is possible to re-route information through the decentralised computer 
system such that the effects of the failure are considerably reduced, if  not eliminated. 
Expansion may easily be accommodated with small variations to software and the ability 
to add further decentralised systems. Comparatively small software systems are used 
making trouble shooting easier. The number o f service requests undertaken by each 
decentralised computer is smaller making problems easier to isolate. These systems, do 
however still have size limitations dictated by the communications burden imposed on 
both the link and decentralised computers. As such, the integrity o f the system cannot be
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guaranteed as the system expands.
This is overcome by creating a coordinating function, to remove the communication 
burden from the decentralised computer and supervise the required information flow 
between decentralised controllers resulting in a hierarchical structure, Fig.3.3. 
Hierarchical computer integrated systems have the advantages o f decentralised systems, 
but are capable o f controlling large systems, without loading of communications links as 
the system size increases. As the system size increases, further levels are added to the 
hierarchy and the functions within the hierarchy become very similar to those occurring 
within the classical hierarchically arranged organisation, Fig.3.4. Within the hierarchical 
system, the higher level subsystems have priority o f action or right o f intervention over 
lower levels. At the same time, the higher levels are dependent on performance of the 
lower levels and the information they feed back to enable them to make decisions. The 
functionality o f the hierarchical computer system, as applied to power systems, is 
discussed in more detail in the following section.
3.3 Computer Integrated Systems for the Control and Protection of Power 
Systems
The control and protection o f a large power system, say with dimensions shown in Table 
2.1, whilst exploiting the benefits o f the computer integrated system, must be effected by 
a hierarchical integrated computer system. In applying this to a large power system, the
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architecture o f the hardware as shown in Fig.3.5 is derived. This is known as the 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system. The first level comprises of 
the system computer overseeing the entire control and protection system, whilst the 
remaining three levels o f the hierarchical structure are derived by a top down natural 
decomposition o f the power system into station host computer, bay level protection 
clusters, and switch yard resident data acquisition units. The functionality o f each o f the 
decentralised computers is briefly discussed here although the detailed implementation will 
be outlined in Chapter 7.
The system computer oversees the entire integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system. The substation station host computer communicates with the system 
computer and all adjacent substations to obtain information relating to the status o f the 
system to enable the reduced model parameters to be calculated by the protection clusters. 
Information relating the current system status received from the protection clusters is 
communicated to the system computer and adjacent substation computers requiring this 
information. The protection clusters collate the data provided by the data acquisition 
units for use by the station computer and utilise the data provided by the station computer 
to adjust their respective setting values. The data acquisition units perform the necessary 
control functions on their associated circuit breakers and gather information directly from 
the system which is passed to the protection clusters via optical fibre communications link.
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E xecution
Figure 3.4 Overview of Functions Required to be Performed by the Computer Integrated System within the Business
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CHAPTER 4
ADAPTIVE PROTECTION AND CONTROL WITHIN A HIERARCHICAL
SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
The integrity o f the transmission network is closely correlated to the performance of 
the control and protection systems. To maintain, and i f  necessary increase, the 
performance of an evolving power system, techniques that improve the integrity o f the 
protection and control functions in an economic manner are of considerable interest. 
The computer integrated system, by integrating information, provides a mechanism for 
performance enhancement. This chapter reviews the requirements for protection 
systems. The limitations of conventional protection are outlined and provide a 
framework for the introduction of an integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system for the optimisation of protection performance.
4.2 Requirements of Protection Systems
4.2.1 Introduction
The objective of protection is to maintain continuity o f supply by the rapid isolation of
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faulted plant. This ensures minimum damage to all plant and reduces the effect o f the 
fault on the remainder o f the power system. Protection systems must be dependable, 
discriminative, economic and operate in a time to meet system dynamic requirements. 
The requirements of protection systems are outlined below.
4.2.2 Reliability Requirements
When a system fault occurs, protection is required to detect the fault rapidly and 
remove it from the system by initiating the opening o f the associated circuit breaker. 
Protection located on adjacent plant w ill detect the fault, but must be able to 
discriminate between this fault and faults on the primary plant which they are designed 
to protect. This leads to the concepts o f protection dependability and security [4.1],
•  Protection Dependability is defined as a measure of the ability o f the 
system protection to initiate circuit breaker tripping correctly.
•  Protection Security is defined as a measure of the ability o f the 
protection system to not operate incorrectly for faults on non-faulted 
sections of the system.
The requirements of dependability and security are mutually contradictory and methods 
should be found of optimising them. The reliability o f the power system is quantified 
in terms of the dependability index, Dp, and security index, Sp [4.1]:
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A = total number o f system faults.
Fj = number o f faults where there was a failure to trip the circuit breaker.
F2 = number of faults on which there was an unwanted circuit breaker 
operation.
These are annually evaluated, with the dependability index having a typical value of
99.1 % and the security index having a value o f 97.3% [4.1].
4.2.3 Fault Clearance Time Requirements
The time period in which a fault is on the system has two effects:
•  Stress: Under fault conditions, the components in the system undergo
large stresses dependent on the current short circuit levels in the system.
To avoid component degradation and possible damage, system faults
must be removed as quickly as possible.
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•  Stability: Stability is influenced by the time constants and inertias of the 
power system components and the operating times of switch-gear and 
protection relays to remove faults. The longest time that a fault may 
remain on the system without the system going unstable is known as the 
critical clearing time (CCT). It is imperative to maintain stability 
through fault disturbances so that fault clearance times are less than the 
CCT, on the power system.
To retain system transient stability and avoid stressing system components, faults 
should be cleared as quickly as possible. Primary protection should clear faults within 
80ms and back-up protection should aim to clear faults within 300ms [4.1].
4.2.4 Maximum Load Current Requirements
Protection systems installed should be designed to operate throughout the range of 
probable operational loadings including short time overload capabilities. Where 
constraints are identified, the cost o f improving the protection system to the benefit o f 
improved utilisation should be assessed.
4.2.5 System Management Requirements
In complex systems, the issues of management become far more complex. To keep
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out-of-merit operation o f generation plant to a minimum, it is essential that 
maintenance and refurbishment programmes for the entire system coordinate with one 
another. In addition, these should be minimised.
4.3 Limitations of Conventional Protection Systems
4.3.1 Distance Protection
Changes in power system conditions influence the functionality o f protection relays. 
For unit protection schemes, the influence of the power system state external to the 
protected unit is minimal, and techniques such as the bias setting have been used to 
optimise the performance. This is not the case for non-unit protection schemes, 
essentially distance relays, where changes in the power system operating conditions 
have a marked effect. The key effects and their causes are summarised below.
4.3.1.1 Multi-terminal Lines
It is well known that the measured impedance for a multi-terminal transmission system 
arrangement is dependent on the throttling point infeeds. The measured impedance of 
a relay at busbar A for a fault that is a proportion a along TB, Fig.4.1, is given by the 
expression:
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This illustrates that in teed feeder arrangements [4.2], the ideal zone 1 setting 
impedance is dependent on the variation of the fault current contribution of ICT relative 
to IAT. In a similar manner, the influence of the infeeds at the remote end o f a 
protected feeder influences the backup zone setting values. To ensure correct relay 
operation it is necessary to either:
Zm ta iu r t d ‘BT (4.3)
This may be written more succinctly as:
Zm ta tu n d (4.4)
where T is the throttling or infeed ratio and is given by the expression:
T = (4.5)
•  place constraints on the operation of the power system.
•  protect the system with unit protection schemes.
•  ensure that the system has knowledge of the fault current infeed ratio.
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4.3.1.2 High Resistance Earth Faults
For single end fed systems, earth fault impedance causes protection relay under-reach. 
This is illustrated by considering a phase to earth fault in a residually compensated 
phase to earth element of a distance relay. Using symmetrical component theory it can 
be shown that, for say an a-phase to earth fault, the measured impedance, ZmctLSUmi, to 
the fault point is given by the expression [1.46]:
3 JJt
^ m ta tu r td  ® + j  + ^  j  (4.6)
a r*s r t t
Fig.4.2 shows how the impedance presented to the relay varies with changing fault 
resistance Rf. For high resistance earth faults, the impedance presented to the relay 
falls outside the characteristic resulting in the relay mal-operation. For double end fed 
systems [4.3] this is further exacerbated by the influence of the unknown remote end 
infeed. The issues o f the correct operation o f distance relays subjected to high 
resistance earth faults is considered in more detail in Chapter 6.
4.3.1.3 Pre-fault Loading
Pre-fault loading influences the operation of the distance relay in both pre-fault and 
fault conditions. The impedance presented to the a-phase to b-phase element o f a
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distance relay is given by the expression:
V -V ha b
i  - ha b
The corresponding measured impedance presented to the a-phase to earth element of 
the residually compensated distance relay is:
(4.8)I  +K J
Under pre-fault operating conditions, both the phase to phase and phase to earth 
measured impedances show that an increase in pre-fault load current corresponds to a 
reduction in the measured impedance. This is illustrated in the impedance plane in 
Fig.4.3. For a mho type distance relay, continued load impedance reduction results 
in encroachment into the protection relay characteristic and subsequent relay mal- 
operation.
Under fault conditions, the pre-fault loading has the effect o f redistributing the fault 
current in the network. This influences the infeed ratios which have repercussions as 
outlined in section 4.3.1.1.
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4.3.1.4 Topological Variations
Under faulted network conditions, changes in topology alter the impedance path from 
the source to the fault point. The measured impedance, Zrocjtfured, by the relay at busbar 
1 for the system of Fig.4.4 representing a portion o f a large network is given by the 
expression:
~ ~ ^ 1 3  14 3
^M »a tu r*d~^14 “' 24' _ (4.9)
14
In a large interconnected network, changes in topology may be represented by changes 
in Z13 resulting in changes in the current contribution I13 and redistributions of the fault 
current contributions in the feeders. These changes alter the ratio of I 13 to I 14 and hence 
influence the infeed ratio. As outlined in section 4.3.1.1 the infeed influences the 
apparent impedance measured at the relaying point. It should be noted that the 
influence of topological variations, especially in the local vicinity o f the protected 
feeder, are large and of great importance in the determination of protection relay back­
up setting values.
4.3.1.5 Mutual Coupling in Ground Impedance Protection
Mutual coupling, due to either double circuit transmission lines on the same tower or
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a number of parallel transmission lines using the same right of way, introduces a 
measured impedance error [4.4]. For an earth fault in one of the parallelled circuits, 
Fig.4.5.a, the fault current subdivides between the two circuits. The current flowing 
in one of the circuits induces a voltage in the adjacent circuit. The corresponding 
positive phase sequence and negative phase sequence mutual impedances between 
circuits are small enough to be neglected, although this is not the case for the zero 
phase sequence mutual impedance. Using equivalent circuit representation, Fig.4.5.b, 
the distance relay w ill measure a voltage VmcMUred and current 1 ^ ^  given by the 
expressions:
Vm ta tu r td (4.10)
and:
1m ta s u r td (4.11)
The measured impedance, Z,'measured w ill be:
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=  ° “ * U 1  +
‘ AO mO
1 CO +  * 1 0
(4.12)
This illustrates that the relay w ill under-reach. For correct impedance measurement, 






^m taturtd  ~  ^ C l  +  ^C2 +  ^C0‘ „  +  ^ A 0 ~I (4.14)
L l l  L U
and the measured impedance reflects the true fault position.
4.3.1.6 Source Impedance Ratio (SIR) Variations
The SIR is the ratio of source impedance to line impedance. The source impedance is 
a measure of the fault level at the relaying point and w ill vary dependent on the power
Chapter 4: Adaptive Protection and Control within a Hierarchical System
system operating conditions, configuration and methods o f earthing. For resistive 
faults, the measured impedance by the relay becomes a function o f the remote end 
infeed as outlined in section 4.3.1.2 and dependent on the SIR at each end o f the line 
significant errors can be introduced into the apparent impedance measured at the 
relaying point. On the UK transmission system, the SIR varies from about 0.1 (35 
GVA source and 100 km line) to about 11.5 (5 GVA source and 10 km line).
4.3.1.7 Power Swings
When synchronous sources at either end of a feeder swing with respect to one another, 
Fig.4.6.a, the measured impedance, at the relaying point varies [4.5, 4.6, 4.7]
in accordance with the relation:




(— -  cos0) -  y.sinO
En
E
(— -  cos0)2 + sin20
En
-  2 (4.15)
Fig.4.6.b illustrates how changes in 0  can result in encroachment into the relay 
characteristic resulting in mal-operation.
4.3.1.8 Reliability
A relay setting is a compromise between the requirements o f dependability and security
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[4.8, 4.9]. Under light system loading, protection relays should ideally be biased 
towards dependability; the perceived need being to get the fault o ff the system as 
quickly as possible. However, under heavy loading, the in-advertent loss of a line 
caused by a false trip is far more serious. Under these circumstances protection system 
dependability is ideally sacrificed to ensure protection system security. The required 
level of dependability is usually achieved by the introduction of redundancy while the 
level o f security is determined by the inter-locking between relays. In conventional 
protection systems, levels of redundancy and relay inter-locking are fixed resulting in 
modes o f operation o f the power system where protection reliability is less than 
optimal.
4.3.1.9 Operating Time Setting
Protection relay time settings are pre-set. However, there are scenarios, where it 
would be beneficial to vary this:
•  Optimise Dependability and Security Dependent on Fault Position:
To optimise dependability and security for a distance relay requires 
analysis o f the fault position relative to the reach-point before making 
a trip decision. For faults well inside the boundary, the relay can 
operate immediately without the danger o f mal-operation due to over­
reach. For faults close to the boundary, the relay integrates fault values
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for a long time to overcome noise and ensure accuracy.
•  Optimise Dependability and Security Dependent on Fault Type:
Multi-phase faults may be detected more quickly than single phase to 
ground faults. Thus, by identifying the fault type, the decision to trip 
the relay may be made faster for some faults resulting in improved 
security and dependability.
•  L im it Stress and Avoid Instability: See section 4.2.3.
4.3.1.10 Auto-Reclosure Time Setting
The optimum reclose time is dependent on the time taken for the secondary arc to
extinguish [4.10, 4.11]. I f  the reclosure time is too short, reclosure w ill take place 
before arc extinction which may result in initiation of a further trip. Conversely, the 
time to reclose must not be excessive to ensure continuity o f supply. In conventional 
auto-reclose schemes, the reclose time is set such that under changing power system 
conditions it is not always optimal.
4.3.2 Optimising the Performance by Adaptive Relaying in a Hierarchical
Protection and Control System
Adaptive protection incorporates additional functionality to overcome the influence of 
changing power system conditions. The additional functionality is achieved by
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providing the relay with further information. The information may be derived either 
locally by more detailed analysis of the traditional current and voltage input 
measurands, or remotely by transmission to the relaying point o f additional 
information. The information required is related directly to the system conditions 
resulting in protection relay mal-operation. The implementation o f adaptive protection 
functions using either locally or remotely derived information are not new and have, 
to a limited extent, been exploited by the protection engineer. For example, the non­
unit cross polarised mho distance relay, using traditional measurements, may adapt to 
improve earth fault coverage and ensure detection o f close up faults by introduction of 
the polarising voltage derived from the healthy voltage phases.
The application of enhanced signal processing techniques and artificial intelligence has 
continued to improve the performance of the discrete stand-alone adaptive relay 
provided with the traditional input measurands o f its conventional equivalent 
counterpart. However, the limited information available at the relaying point limits the 
performance enhancements possible. The second mechanism provides the relay with 
additional information relating to the current status o f the entire power system. This 
additional information may be derived by information integration. As was shown in 
chapter 3, the hierarchical computer integrated system provides the ideal framework 
to undertake this.
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Figure 4.1 Influence of Infeed
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Figure 4.2 Influence of Earth Fault Resistance
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Figure 4.3 Influence of Load
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Figure 4.4 Influence of Topology
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Figure 4.5 Influence of Mutual Coupling
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Figure 4.6 Influence of Power Swings
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CHAPTER 5
OPTIMISATION OF DISTANCE RELAY BACKUP PERFORMANCE 
W ITHIN AN INTEGRATED DIG ITAL HIERARCHICAL CONTROL AND
PROTECTION SYSTEM
5.1 Introduction
A relay setting is the main mechanism for the configuration o f the protection relay. The 
setting of the protection relay has traditionally reflected the worst case fault scenario 
expected on the system and is based on the utilities' setting strategy, topology, assumed 
operating conditions and experience. For unit forms o f protection, the influence o f the 
power system operating conditions external to the protected unit are minimal and may be 
overcome by the use of bias settings. This is not the case for non-unit schemes, essentially 
distance relays, where the influence of the state o f the power system, may leave the relay 
under-set or over-set. The strategy used for setting distance relays, by virtue o f multiple 
zones, reflects this lack o f information and aims to keep distance protection operating as 
optimally as possible. There are however, three scenarios where this is difficult to 
achieve:
•  Clearance of High Resistance Earth Faults in Zone 1: Faults with
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resistance make the measured impedance at the relaying point a function 
o f the unknown remote end infeed current.
•  Zone 1 Setting on Teed Feeders: The setting o f the zone 1 element on 
teed feeders is dependent on the fault current infeed contributions at the 
tee point.
•  Backup Settings (Zone 2 and Zone 3): The setting o f the backup zones 
is dependent on the fault current infeed contributions at the remote bus.
This chapter will concentrate on the last two of these. The issues for the correct operation 
o f distance relays subjected to high resistance earth faults are considered in more detail 
in Chapter 6 . For example, consider a relay located on the Wylfa to Pentir feeder at the 
Wylfa bus of the North Wales Grid System shown in Fig. 5.1. The zone 3 setting for this 
relay, in accordance with the NGC setting strategy [5.2, 5.3] should be capable of seeing 
faults at the remote end of any line out of the substation at the remote end o f the protected 
feeder, whilst avoiding load encroachment and over-reach into the distribution system. 
Fig.5.2 shows how the impedance measured by this relay varies as three phase faults are 
applied along Pentir to Deeside Feeder. Several curves are shown in Fig.5.2 for a variety 
of operating conditions together with the actual impedance from the relaying point to the 
fault. It is seen that changing the operational conditions has a large effect on the 
measured impedance thus making the optimum setting o f the zone 3 reach difficult to 
calculate. Thus, to ensure continuing optimal relay operation, there is a need to constantly
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change or adapt the settings of the distance relays to reflect current power system 
conditions. It was shown in chapter 4 that adaptation may be effected by supplying the 
relay with further information, via say an integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system. The method by which this is achieved is outlined in the following 
section.
5.2. The Adaptive Setting of Protection Relays within a Hierarchical Control and 
Protection System
5.2.1 Background
The setting o f a protection relay has traditionally been performed by the protection 
engineer based on assumed operating conditions, experience, the setting strategy and the 
power system configuration. More recently, the widespread availability o f the computer 
has witnessed the emergence of software applications that model the power system and 
calculate the settings of protection relays. In its simplest form, the adaptive setting of 
protection relays within an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system 
may be performed by having a computer model of the entire system at each o f the relaying 
points within the system whose parameters were continually updated. However, as the 
size o f the power system increases, the logistics o f information transfer would become 
impractical. An alternative approach is to decompose the power system model into a
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number of power sub-system models where the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system computer provides information relating to the influence of the 
remainder o f the power system on each o f the power sub-systems. Rockefeller et-al 
[1.49] were the first to describe how a simple impedance model (power sub-system 
model) o f the power system, with up-to-date parameters relating to the current power 
system conditions was capable of improving protection reliability and maximising 
utilisation o f the transmission system. The simple model should contain features enabling 
the correct adaptation o f the protection relays functionality. For setting adaptation, the 
reduced model should include information that enables evaluation o f the performance of 
the settings. For the case where the protection relays are of non-unit 3 zone distance type, 
it is beneficial for the reduced model, Fig.5.3, to retain the protected feeder parameters, 
all adjacent feeders out o f the local substation, all adjacent feeders leaving the remote 
substation, and all feeders leaving the next but one substation for the correct setting of 
both primary and back-up functions. The reduced model requires information including:
•  impedances and circuit breaker status o f all feeders leaving the substation 
(including transformers). This enables evaluation o f the performance of 
the zone 1 distance relay element and the reverse zone 3 reach.
•  impedances and circuit breaker status of all feeders leaving the substation 
(including transformers) at the remote end o f the protected feeder. This 
enables evaluation o f the zone 2 and zone 3 elements o f the distance relay.
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•  impedances and circuit breaker status o f all feeders leaving the remote but 
one substation. This enables evaluation o f the zone 3 element o f the 
distance relay to ensure that it does not significantly over-reach.
•  equivalent impedances representing the influence o f the remainder o f the 
system on the reduced model.
•  pre-fault busbar voltages.
Using the reduced model, the fault conditions that reflect those corresponding to a similar 
fault in the actual system can be reconstructed. Traditional fault calculation requires the 
construction o f the impedance matrix and evaluation o f the fault currents with respect to 
pre-fault system conditions. To enable flexibility in the adaptive setting o f protection 
relays, an impedance matrix is reconstructed.
5.2.2 Reconstruction of the Reduced Model Impedance Matrix
To enable the construction o f the reduced model, consider the simple power system 
network with an admittance matrix o f the form:
m= (5.1)
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The reduced admittance matrix is obtained using the standard reduction technique [5.1]:
^REDUCED^ =  ^ A ~  *£*£> *c  (^*2)
Under changing power system conditions, both the form and elements o f the admittance 
matrix vary. For the system of Fig.5.4, the admittance matrix, subject to the operating 
condition where all circuit breakers are closed, has the form:
’*11 0 0 0 *15 0 0 0 0
0 *22 0 0 *25 0 0 0 *29
0 0 *33 *34 0 *36 *37 0 0
0 0 *43 *44 *45 0 0 0 0
*51 *52 0 *54 *55 0 0 0 0
0 0 *63 0 0 *66 0 0 0
0 0 *73 0 0 0 Y77 0 *79
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y•*88 *89
© Y92 0 0 0 0 *97 y98 *99
For the arbitrary case where the reduced network for relay adaptation contains only 
busbars 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the reduced admittance matrix incorporating the effects o f the 
remainder o f network has the form shown below and illustrated in Fig.5.5. The system 
computer automatically formulates the reduced impedance model for the substation 
computer using search, matrix re-ordering and reduction techniques such that the model
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retains the features described in section 5.2.1 for relay adaptation.
0 0 0 * 1 3
0 * 2 3 0 * 2 3
m - 0 * 3 2 * 3 3 * 3 4 0
0 0 * 3 3 * 4 4 * 4 3
.7« * 3 2
0 * 3 4 * 3 3
For a given fault, the directly reduced network fault conditions are directly comparable 
to those of the original system. This network not only has the required retained feeders 
in the network but also equivalent sources and fictitious interconnection feeders. Should 
the operating conditions change, for example the feeder between busbars 7 and 9 has been 
removed following the clearance o f a fault, the reduced admittance matrix will change. 
The admittance matrix will have the form shown below and the equivalent network will 
be that ofFig.5.6.
* n 0 0 0 * 3 3
0 * 2 2 0 0 * 2 3
m - 0 0 * 3 3 * 3 4 0
0 0 * 4 3 * 4 4 * 4 3
.r * i * 3 2 0 * 3 4 * 3 3
(5 .5 )
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For the adaptive setting of distance relays, the parameters in the admittance matrix must 
be continually updated via the hierarchical structure. The derived admittance matrix, 
reflecting the current operating conditions, may then be inverted to obtain the impedance 
matrix:
Z !4 Z !5
Z b Z 24 Z 2S
Z*i Z 33 Z 34 Z 35
Z 43 Z 44 Z 45
Z s . z 52 Z 53 Z 54 Z 55
With knowledge of the pre-fault busbar voltages, short circuit analysis may be performed 
for calculating the faulted network busbar voltages and branch currents using the well 
developed power system analysis techniques. The faulted network data then enables 
adaptive protection relay setting and evaluation.
5.2.3 Setting the Protection Relays in the Adaptive Environment
The settings o f protection relays have traditionally been performed in accordance with a 
setting strategy. Within the hierarchical control and protection system, a number of 
strategies have been tried some of which are based on the NGC strategy and others being
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based on analysing the performance of the protection. The various setting strategies are 
outlined below. To provide a basis on which to compare the performance o f the various 
strategies, the first o f the strategies listed below is not in fact a strategy but the actual 
settings o f the system:
1) Actual NGC Settings: These settings are user specified settings such as those that 
might currently be on the system. These may have been determined by a strategy such as 
that o f NGC [5.2, 5.3] in accordance with the following:
•  Worst case power system operating conditions.
•  Protection engineer experience.
2) Adaptive NGC Strategy Settings: These settings have been calculated in strict 
accordance with the NGC setting strategy. Whereas the actual NGC setting reflects worst 
case power system operating conditions, this adaptive setting reflects the current 
operating conditions and enables consideration o f the influence of the current:
•  Topology.
•  Short Circuit Levels.
3) Adaptive NGC Strategy with Zone 3 Setting Using Actual Throttling Factor: The
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NGC Setting Strategy conditions the remote end throttling factor dependent on the 
topological configuration at the remote busbar associated with the protection. This 
setting is similar to that o f (2 ) but instead o f using the conditioned throttling factor, the 
actual throttling factor is used.
4) Adaptive NGC Strategy with Zone 3 Setting Using Actual Throttling Factor and 
Constrained By Current Loading: Conventional protection is set to avoid incorrect 
operation due to worst case load encroachment. However, often the load impedance is 
far less constraining than the worst case load impedance. This setting exploits this by 
constraining the setting in accordance with the actual load and not the worst case load. 
In addition, the actual throttling factor, as opposed to the conditioned throttling factor is 
used.
5) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Maximum Dependability but constrained by 
Worst Case Loading: The Zone 3 Setting is ideally required to clear faults at all busbars 
at the remote end of all feeders leaving the substation at the remote end o f the protected 
feeder. This setting maximises the dependability o f the Zone 3 Setting to ensure this 
occurs, subject to worst case load encroachment.
6 ) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Maximum Security but constrained by Worst 
Case Loading: Whilst the Zone 3 Setting is ideally required to clear faults at all busbars
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at the remote end of all feeders leaving the substation at the remote end o f the protected 
feeder it should not operate for faults at any other busbars within the system. This setting 
maximises the security o f the Zone 3 Setting, subject to worst case load encroachment.
7) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Minimum Mal-operation (Incorrect Operation 
+ Failures to Operate) with Dependability Bias but constrained by Worst Case 
Loading: This setting minimises the number o f mal-operations by considering both the 
security and dependability requirements. Should a scenario arise in which two different 
settings minimise the number of mal-operations, the larger is chosen to minimise the 
number of failures to operate. This is subject to worst case load encroachment.
8 ) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Minimum Mal-operation (Incorrect Operation 
+ Failures to Operate) with Security Bias but constrained by Worst Case Loading:
This setting minimises the number of mal-operations by considering both the security and 
dependability requirements. Should a scenario arise in which two different settings 
minimise the number of mal-operations, the smaller is chosen to minimise the number of 
incorrect operations. This is subject to worst case load encroachment.
9) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Maximum Dependability but constrained by 
Actual Loading: The Zone 3 Setting is ideally required to clear faults at all busbars at 
the remote end of all feeders leaving the substation at the remote end o f the protected
102
Chapter 5: Optimisation of Distance Relay Backup Performance Within An
Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control and Protection System
feeder. This setting maximises the dependability o f the Zone 3 Setting to ensure this 
occurs, subject to actual load encroachment.
10) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Maximum Security but constrained by Actual 
Loading: Whilst the Zone 3 Setting is ideally required to clear faults at all busbars at the 
remote end of all feeders leaving the substation at the remote end o f the protected feeder 
it should not operate for faults at any other busbars within the system. This setting 
maximises the security o f the Zone 3 Setting, subject to actual load encroachment.
11) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Minimum Mal-operation (Incorrect Operation 
+ Failures to Operate) with Dependability Bias but constrained by Actual Loading:
This setting minimises the number of mal-operations by considering both the security and 
dependability requirements. Should a scenario arise in which two different settings 
minimise the number o f mal-operations, the larger is chosen to minimise the number of 
failures to operate. This is subject to actual load encroachment.
12) Adaptive Setting Optimised For Minimum Mal-operation (Incorrect Operation 
+ Failures to Operate) with Security Bias but constrained by Worst Case Loading:
This setting minimises the number o f mal-operations by considering both the security and 
dependability requirements. Should a scenario arise in which two different settings 
minimise the number of mal-operations, the smaller is chosen to minimise the number of
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incorrect operations. This is subject to worst case load encroachment.
Details o f the reasoning behind the setting o f relays in accordance with these 
methodologies are explained in the following sections.
5.3 Results
To analyse the performance o f the adaptive settings, the North Wales 400 / 275 kV Grid 
System has been used. The power system operating conditions within the North Wales 
System, correspond to the predicted 1994/95 Winter Peak. All power system operating 
conditions and data are summarised in Appendix A. Based on this data, a number of 
adaptive settings have been calculated and the relative performance o f each o f the settings 
for faults at busbars throughout the network categorised in terms o f failures to operate 
and incorrect operations. The relative performance of the individual setting strategies is 
illustrated in Fig.5.7.
5.4 Analysis of Results
5.4.1 Introduction to Adaptive Setting
The actual NGC settings (Setting 1 ) have been determined by the strategy and have been
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set to operate for faults based on the worst case power system operating conditions. For 
any other operating condition, this may leave the relay under-set or over-set. By using 
the NGC strategy in an adaptive manner (Setting 2), variations in operating conditions, 
caused say by changes in topology and short circuit levels, can be accommodated subject 
to conditions imposed by the strategy such as distribution system over-reach constraint, 
throttling factor conditioning, and load constraint. The last two conditions form the basis 
o f a further two setting strategies, and as such will shortly be discussed. The first 
condition, distribution system over-reach, is optimised by the introduction o f the adaptive 
algorithm based on Setting 2. For example, consider the setting o f the zone 3 element of 
the Deeside to Legacy feeder at the Deeside busbar, the salient features being represented 
in Fig.5.8 . To simplify the calculations, it will also be assumed that the impedances o f the 
transformers are the same and given by Z. To avoid distribution system over-reach, it is 
required that the relay does not operate for faults at the Legacy 132 kV busbar. Should 
one of the transformers at Legacy be taken out o f service, say following a fault or due to 
maintenance requirements, the impedance between the Legacy 400 kV busbar and the 
Legacy 132 kV busbar increases from Z/4 to Z/3. This increase in impedance, arising 
from a topological variation reduces the distributions system over-reach constraint and 
may be exploited by adaptive schemes.
5.4.2 Alterations to the NGC Strategy for Relay Adaptation
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The NGC setting strategy constrains the settings to avoid load encroachment and 
distribution system over-reach. Whilst proving a highly successful method o f avoiding the 
aforementioned problems, relay mal-operation can be introduced by the failure o f the zone 
3 element o f relays to clear faults at the remote busbar out o f the next substation. As 
such, for certain operating conditions, irrespective o f the introduction o f adaptive 
algorithms, the performance o f the protection system cannot always be improved. This 
is illustrated in Fig.5.9 by considering the Legacy to Deeside Feeder at the Legacy Busbar 
which fails to clear faults at the Capenhurst 275 kV busbars, Pentir 400 kV busbar, 
Trawsfynydd 400 kV mesh comer, and Daines 400 kV busbar using both actual and 
adaptive settings. However, there are three areas where relaxation of the conditions in 
the setting strategy could improve the performance o f the adaptive protection system 
resulting in advantages of implementation of adaptive schemes over conventional schemes:
•  The setting o f protection relays using the actual throttling factor at all
times (ie: Setting 3 - see section 5.4.2.1).
•  The setting of protection relays constrained by actual load and not worst
case load (ie: Settings 4, 9, 1 0  and 11 - see sections 5.4.2 . 2  and 5.4.2 .3).
•  The setting o f protection relays to detect faults appearing in negative
quadrants in the impedance plane (see section 5.5.2).
5.4.2.1 The Setting of Protection Relays using the Actual Throttling Factor.
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The setting of zone 3 elements o f protection relays in accordance with the NGC strategy 
is subjected to conditioning of the throttling factor at the remote bus o f the protected 
feeder in the following manner:
•  Should the number o f feeders into the remote substation o f the protected 
feeder be less than 4, it is assumed that the throttling factor is 1.0.
•  For protected feeder arrangements where the number o f feeders into the 
remote substation is greater than or equal to 4, the 3 largest infeeds are 
ignored.
Under a variety of operating conditions, the relay will over-reach or under-reach and may 
lead to mal-operation. This strategy uses the actual throttling factor for the setting o f the 
relay to enable the relay to be more attuned to current power system conditions. Consider 
the setting of the relay on Legacy to Deeside Feeder at the Legacy Busbar illustrated in 
Fig.5.1. Mal-operation of the zone 3 element o f the distance relay for a 3 phase fault 
applied to the Pentir 400 kV Busbar for both the actual NGC setting, Fig.5.9.a, and the 
adaptive setting determined in direct accordance with the NGC strategy, Fig.5.9.b occurs. 
However, using the actual throttling factor, the relay correctly operates, Fig.5.9.c (ie: 
point 6  is inside the characteristic circle).
107
Chapter 5: Optimisation of Distance Relay Backup Performance Within An
Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control and Protection System
5.4.2.2 The Setting of Protection Relays Constrained By Actual Load and
Not Worst Case Load.
Whilst the relay on Legacy to Deeside Feeder at the Legacy Busbar using the adaptive 
setting with the actual throttling factor manages to clear the Pentir 400 kV busbar fault, 
and offer improved performance relative to the actual setting (setting 1 ) and the adapted 
setting in accordance with the strategy (setting 2 ), all three settings fail to clear faults at 
the Trawsfynydd 400 kV mesh comer and the Capenhurst 275 kV busbars. By not 
constraining the zone 3 setting by worst case load but by actual load, the relay coverage 
o f faults is improved. In this instance, faults at the Trawsfynydd mesh-comer and the 
Capenhurst 275 kV busbars remains undetected. As such, although the performance is 
improved, it is not perfect.
5.4.2.3 Optimising Protection Reliability
Setting protection relays in accordance with actual load and not worst case load increases 
the probability of incorrect relay operation, the final setting being a compromise between 
the requirements of dependability and security, the required level being obtained by further 
checks similar to those of ensuring correct operation of the zone 2  element on transformer 
feeders. For example, consider the system of Fig.5.10. The zone 3 element o f the relay 
protecting transmission line AB at busbar A is ideally required to clear faults at busbars
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C and E. Operating conditions can arise in which the measured impedance for a fault at 
busbar D will cause the relay to incorrectly operate. The adaptive algorithm is then faced 
with the dilemma:
•  I f  the setting is reduced, it cannot be guaranteed that the zone 3 element 
will clear faults at busbars C and E.
•  I f  the setting ensures that the zone 3 element will clear faults at busbars C 
and E, then the relay will operate incorrectly for faults at busbar D.
This leads to the concepts o f protection dependability and security, the concepts o f which 
have already been outlined in section 4.2.2. The traditional mechanisms of achieving 
preset levels of dependability and security have been outlined in section 4.3.1.8. 
However, by adaptively changing the setting the ratio o f security to dependability can also 
be varied. This forms the basis for the remaining setting strategies (settings 5 to 12). 
Using these strategies the protection can be configured to:
•  maximise dependability (ie: Settings 5 and 9).
•  maximise security (ie: Settings 6  and 1 0 ).
•  minimise the total number of mal-operations including both incorrect 
operations and failures to operate (ie: Settings 7, 8 , 1 1  and 12).
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Each of these settings may be constrained by the worst case loading or constrained by the 
actual loading. It should be noted that in minimising the total number o f mal-operations, 
scenarios arise in which a range of settings have the same performance. To overcome 
this, the setting is biased to either dependability or security.
This move away from the conventional setting strategy approach has a significant impact 
on the performance of the protection system. As shown in Fig.5.7.c, the total number of 
mal-operations can be reduced from 78 in the case o f the actual NGC setting to 29 by 
minimising the number o f mal-operations. Importantly, the protection system can be 
configured dependent on the system operators requirements for security and 
dependability.
5.5 Limitations of Protection Relay Adaptation
5.5.1 Introduction
Whilst it is desirable to attain 100% performance of the protection system, the practical 
and economic issues o f attaining this make it impossible. With the distance relay, some 
of the fundamental principles on which the relay design itself are based make this 
impossible to achieve. Three limitations are discussed below.
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5.5.2 The Setting of Relays with Measured Impedances in Negative Quadrants of 
the Impedance Plane.
In highly inter-connected networks, operating scenarios arise, Fig.5.11, in which the 
measured impedance by the relay for a fault out o f the next substation to the protected 
feeder will appear in the negative quadrants of the impedance plane and fail to initiate the 
protection. This results from the influence o f the remote end throttling, T ( ^ / I* ) .  To 
ensure correct operation of distance relays in adaptive schemes the criterion for the 
reverse reach needs alteration together with the ability to change the characteristic type 
and shape. As such, this shows a limitation of the current system. This is illustrated by 
considering the measured impedance, Fig.5.9, seen by the distance relay on the Legacy 
to Deeside Feeder at the Legacy busbar for a fault on the Trawsfynydd 400 kV mesh 
comer ofFig.5.1. To ensure correct operation of distance relays in adaptive schemes the 
criterion for the reverse reach needs to be changed together with the ability to change the 
characteristic type.
5.5.3 Adaptive Setting of Protection Relays in Accordance with Actual Load and 
Not Worst Case Load
When adaptively changing relays in accordance with actual load and not worst case load, 
careful consideration should be given to the performance of the relays under operational
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contingencies. For example, it is well known that under pre-fault operating conditions, 
an increase in load current corresponds to a decrease in measured impedance (see chapter 
4). Thus, should a scenario arise in which load current is suddenly transferred to the 
adaptively protected feeder constrained by actual load and not worst case load, the relay 
could mal-operate before its setting has been updated to reflect the new system loading.
5.5.4 The Setting of Distance Relays Protecting Transformer Feeders
The zone 1 and 2 settings of a distance relay protecting a transformer feeder, determined 
in accordance with the NGC setting strategy, are defined by the relations [5.3]:
■ & 0 % Z u  ♦ 50%.Z„ (5.7)
Z— i * 150%z» + 125%z« (5.8)
In cases where transformer feeders are connected to downstream transmission lines the 
zone 2  invariably over-reaches, the determined setting often detecting faults at the remote 
busbar out of the next substation and hence operates incorrectly. This becomes 
particularly important in the adaptive setting of relays. To ensure coordination and avoid 
over-reach mal-operation o f relays protecting transformer feeders it is necessary to 
significantly reduce the zone 2  setting whilst ensuring that faults at the remote busbar of 
the protected feeder are cleared.
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Figure 5.1 The North Wales 400 / 275 kV Network
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Figure 5.2 The Measured Impedance By a Distance Relay on the Wylfa to Pentir Feeder at the Wylfa Bus for 3 
Phase Faults along the Pentir to Deeside Feeder
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Figure 5.3 The Reduced Impedance Model
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Figure 5.4 Simple Network for Illustrating the Formulation of the Reduced Impedance Model
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Figure 5.5 The Reduced Network for the Operating
Scenario where all Circuit Breakers are Closed
©
Figure 5.6 The Influence of Changes in Topology on the 
Reduced Model
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Figure 5.9.b The Performance of the Zone 3 Element 
(represented by circle) of a Relay on the Legacy to 
Deeside Feeder at the Legacy Bus Using Setting 2
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Figure 5.11 Limitation of Adaptive Relay Setting in Negative Quadrants
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CHAPTER 6
OPTIMISATION OF DISTANCE RELAY PERFORMANCE UNDER HIGH 
RESISTANCE EARTH FAULTS W ITHIN AN INTEGRATED D IG ITAL 
HIERARCHICAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM
6.1 Introduction
Adaptive protection systems optimise the performance of relays by adapting their 
functionality via two principle means: the setting and the characteristic. The previous 
chapter concentrated on the first o f these, the adaptive setting o f distance relays. Whilst 
setting adaptation is important in the optimisation o f the performance o f the distance 
relay, advantanges can only be gained where remote end infeed is influenced. This only 
enables optimisation of:
•  backup functions o f distance relays.
•  distance relays protecting teed feeders.
The second method, characteristic adaptation compliments setting adaptation and enables 
further improvements in the performance of the distance relay. Importantly, it enables 
optimisation of the primary function of the relay. As such, characteristic adaptation forms
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an important and integral part o f relay adaptation.
The relay characteristic has traditionally been chosen by the protection engineer based on 
certain assumptions about the system operating conditions. In analogue and electro­
mechanical relays, the choice of characteristic shapes available has been governed by 
issues of implementation. This is not the case for digital relays in which it is feasible to 
arbitrarily specify the trip region, eg: the quadrilateral relay. As one of the most common 
types o f fault occurring on power systems is the single phase to earth fault, a method of 
adaptively changing the characteristic for this scenario will be outlined. The fault path to 
earth often contains resistance, the magnitude o f which varies considerably depending on 
the cause. For single phase to earth faults resulting from the flashover of the over head 
transmission line insulators such that the conductor is short circuited to ground via the 
tower, the fault resistances may be as high as 10 ohms [6 .1]. However, often towers are 
fitted with ground wires such that the fault resistance seldom exceeds 3 ohms. This is not 
the case for faults caused by contact between vegetation and a conductor; or a broken 
conductor. Here the fault resistance is very high.
The impedance measured by distance relays is adversely effected by the fault path 
resistance. With reference to the one line diagram o f Fig.6 .1, for an a-phase to earth fault 
occurring at F through a fault resistance Rf, the complex measured impedance, Zmcasured, 
by a relay at M is given by:
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Z’M ta su r« d (6.1)
Thus, in contrast to solid faults, resistive faults make the measured impedance at the 
relaying point a function o f the current contribution, 1 ,^ from the remote end. This 
current contribution, or remote end infeed, is dependent not only on the fault position and 
fault resistance, but also the pre-fault power system operating conditions. To determine 
the influence of these effects, it is necessary to derive expressions that relate the power 
system conditions to the measured impedance seen by the distance relay.
For an a-phase to earth fault on the system o f Fig.6.1 the corresponding residually 
compensated element of the relay will measure an apparent impedance given by the 
expression [1.46]:
Zm ta tu re d (6.2)1 + K Ja
This may be written more succinctly as:
ZM ta tu r td (6.3)
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I  + K Ja re t re t
(6.4)
The quantity Zrf is complex and as such has a magnitude and argument, Fig.6.2:
I 2rf |
3 1 ^
I + K Ja res res
(6.5)
0 * arg 3Jf Rf
1 + K Ja res res
(6.6)
To evaluate the influence of the prevailing system conditions and earth fault resistance on 
measured impedance it is important to derive an expression in terms o f these quantities. 
It is shown in Appendix B [6.2] that the measured impedance may be directly related to 
the fault position, fault resistance, source impedances and source voltages by the 
expression:
^ m ta tu r e d  ~  a  ^ l l  +
(Zinl+(\-a).Zu)£ mi+(Zm l+a.Zll)£ nl)
+2.c1+cfr(l +3.K  )1 0 v r e t '
(6.7)
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where:
£  Z +Z„ +Z , + Z -+Z.-+Z . (6-8)m l 11 m l mO 10 mO
To enable analysis, a 400 kV, 100 km double end fed transmission line with parameters 
shown in Appendix C have been used. For the operating conditions shown in Appendix 
D, the influences of all parameters on the measured impedance as fault resistance is varied, 
are illustrated in Fig.6.3 to Fig.6.13. The last diagram is o f particular interest as the area 
formed by the bounding set o f measured impedances in Fig.6.13 illustrates the ideal 
characteristic shape to ensure correct clearance of faults with Rf up to the maximum 
defined in the operating conditions. The ideal characteristic shape varies depending upon 
the prevailing operating conditions. For the two different sets o f operating conditions 
shown in Appendix E and Appendix F, the measured impedance, for single phase to earth 
faults for varying fault location (0 to 80%) and Rf is pictorially illustrated in Fig.6.14. The 
operating conditions in Appendix E relate to a pre-fault load flow from N to M. The 
operating conditions in Appendix F correspond to a pre-fault load flow from M to N. By 
superimposing the conventional mho relay and the quadrilateral relay it is shown in 
Fig.6.15 that the performance when subjected to high resistance earth faults is less than 
optimal. For faults at the zone 1 reach-point, the quadrilateral characteristic is prone to 
under-reaching for the conditions o f importing load (Appendix E). Conversely, for the
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operating conditions of exporting load (Appendix F), the relay over-reaches. The circular 
nature of the mho relay ensures improved performance under conditions o f exporting load 
(Appendix F) at the expense of reduced performance under conditions o f importing load 
(Appendix E). However, if  the zone 1 characteristic were to be adapted to reflect current 
operating conditions, the performance could be optimised.
In order to ensure correct operation of the relay under these conditions, it is necessary to 
change the characteristic or setting of the relay. For the zone 1 element o f the distance 
relay, little can be achieved by changing the setting as the safety margin utilised by the 
utility is largely in place to avoid incorrect operations occurring due to component 
tolerances. However, by adapting the characteristic it is possible to ensure correct 
operation. The ideal characteristic may be approximated by a quadrilateral characteristic 
in which the upper and lower reactance lines have been rotated by 0 ! and 0 2  as illustrated 
in Fig.6.16 about the solid fault reach point resistance line. The angles 0j and 02 are 
determined directly from equation (6 .6 ) and correspond to the maximum fault resistance 
that can be accommodated at the reach-point and relaying point respectively, subject to 
the load and coordination constraints introduced in the previous section.
Using data available via the hierarchical structure and a reduced impedance model of the 
system at the relaying point in conjunction with an expert system having knowledge of the 
protection engineers requirements for the relay, a new characteristic may be determined.
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6.2 System Description
The system developed is illustrated schematically in Fig.6.17, the functionality o f each 
subsystem being briefly discussed.
6.2.1 The Impedance Model
Rockefeller et-al [6.4] introduced the benefits to be gained by providing distance relays 
with a simple impedance model of the system, located at the substation, whose parameters 
were continually updated by a central computing resource to enable optimisation o f the 
performance of the relay using apriori information. In contrast to high speed channels 
required for carrier aided schemes, the performance of the protection is optimised by 
slowly varying parameters that occur due to demand fluctuations and circuit outages. The 
impedance model has the form depicted in Fig.6 .1. The updated impedance model and 
associated data may then be used by the Fault Data Generator.
6.2.2 The Fault Data Generator
Using the impedance model, the fault data generator calculates the impedance, using the 
theory developed in Section 6.1, that the relay would measure for a number of fault 
scenarios encompassing the ideal trip region illustrated in Fig.6.14. Fault scenarios are
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generated over the following ranges:
•  Fault Resistance: 0 to 300 Q
•  Fault Position: 0 to 80 %
This fault data is formulated in a manner for manipulation by the expert system enabling 
generation of the new characteristic.
6.2.3 The Expert System
The expert system comprises three main parts: the knowledge base, the inference engine 
and the interface, Fig.6.18:
•  Knowledge Base: The knowledge base is a database that contains the
information (facts) and rules (relationships) about a specific subject. This 
database holds the information received or discovered and incorporates 
functions for its management (addition, deletion, searching).
•  Inference Engine: The inference engine is the method by which the
computer, as opposed to the human, draws conclusions from the facts and 
relationships contained within the knowledge base.
•  Interface: The interface is the method by which the expert system interacts
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with the outside world.
Within the expert system, knowledge is represented using a frame based approach. The 
frame based method is derived from the simple semantic network method o f knowledge 
representation in which knowledge is represented by a linear graph in which the nodes 
represent objects, events or situations and the arcs represent the relationship between 
nodes. For example to represent the statement that a distance relay has a quadrilateral 
characteristic, one could write:
h a t a
distance relay -  quadrilateral characteristic
Frames are an extension of Semantic Networks in which the nodes are replaced by more 
structured groupings of information. This enables the object (nodes) to be related more 
easily to a number of attributes and their associated values and has the general form:
FRAME object 
{
attribute 1 value 1
attribute 2  value 2
}
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The expert system uses two main frames in its analysis, one defining the fault data and the 
















The expert system, using a set o f rules associated with each line making up the
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characteristic in conjunction with the new power system fault data defines the 
characteristic. The expert system interfaces to a number o f support routines, the most 
commonly used being one to determine the angle, 0, o f the fault resistance factor. The 
rules have the traditional structure:
IF <premise> THEN <action>
The expert system is required to have both forward and backward reasoning. On 
completion, the relay characteristic is updated as shown in Fig.6.16.
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Figure 6.1 Double End Fed Transmission System with Resistive Earth Fault
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Figure 6.2 The Influence of Earth Fault Resistance on Measured Impedance
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Figure 6.3 Influence of Variation of Source Capacity of M with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.6 Influence of Variation of Real Voltage of Source M with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.7 Influence of Variation of Reactive Voltage of Source M with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.8 Influence of Variation of Source Capacity of N with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.10 Influence of Variation of Source Zg0 to Zgl Ratio of N with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.11 Influence of Variation of Real Voltage of Source N with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.12 Influence of Variation of Reactive Voltage of Source N with Fault Resistance
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Figure 6.13 Influence of Variation of Fault Position with Fault Resistance
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To illustrate the potential performance benefits of an integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system two applications have been developed. The first o f these 
applications simulates an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system 
for the adaptive setting of distance relays. The second application illustrates the 
influence of high resistance earth faults on the residually compensated element of a 
distance relay and enables adaptation of the characteristic within a hierarchical 
environment to overcome limitations of conventional systems. Each of the applications 
is discussed in more detail in the following sections.
7.2 Application for Simulation of an Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control 
and Protection System for the Adaptive Setting of Distance Protection 
Relays
7.2.1 Introduction
In chapter 5 it was shown how changes in the power system operating conditions
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influenced the apparent impedance measured by distance relays. A method for the 
adaptive setting of distance relays, using a reduced impedance model located at the 
substation whose parameters were continually updated by the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system was outlined. To enable analysis o f the 
performance of such a system, a simulation has been developed.
Simulation of the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system requires 
simulation of the power system and each of the individual components within the 
hierarchical protection system, some of which may be similar elements occurring more 
than once. The system comprises:
•  the system computer.
•  multiple substation computers.
•  multiple protection cluster computers.
•  multiple data acquisition units.
The operation of the elements in the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system occur in parallel. Further, central to the implementation o f the 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system is the efficient transfer of 
data between the constituent elements of the system. Ideally, a simulation o f a 
hierarchical system would comprise a multi-processor environment with each o f the 
individual processors representing the individual constituent components of the
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hierarchical structure and performing the task associated with that component. The 
inter-process communications are arranged hierarchically. Parallelism in a single 
processor environment may be simulated by time slicing or multi-tasking. To facilitate 
this, the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system has been simulated 
in a Microsoft Windows.
Within the windows environment, the simulation is managed by the application window 
providing a visual standard interface to the user. The window is a combination o f title 
bar, menu bar, scroll bars, borders and client area, the functions of which are well 
documented [7.1] and w ill be assumed to be known.
A menu driven interface provides the principle means of user input to the application. 
The functions of many of the commands are common to all applications running in this 
environment with application specific additions. The menu provides a list o f 
commands that the user can view and choose from. Temporary windows, known as 
dialog boxes, provide simple input and output functions to direct the user in the 
utilisation of the application. For example, additional information necessary for the 
execution of a command is available via a dialog box. The functionality and use o f the 
software is described in more detail in [7.2].
Prior to the implementation of any system it is necessary to carefully evaluate the 
benefit of the introduction of a system to the cost o f implementing the system. In the
155
Chapter 7: Simulation
context o f this research it is necessary to compare the performance of a hierarchical 
control and protection system with traditional systems. The performance o f distance 
relays may be analysed in two modes of operation:
•  Traditional Protection Relaying Mode: In this mode of operation, the 
protection relays using conventional input measurands make a decision 
on whether to operate based on preset constant settings.
•  Adaptive Protection Relaying Mode: In this mode of operation, the 
protection relays using conventional input measurands and information 
available via a hierarchical structure make a decision on whether to 
operate, where the settings have been adapted to reflect current power 
system conditions by using the additional information available. The 
adaptive setting of protection relays has been performed utilising two 
main methods:
1) Setting the relays using variations of the NGC Setting 
Strategy.
2) Optimisation of the Setting in terms of protection 
reliability.
The various setting strategies used have been outlined in chapter 5.
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The simulation has been validated to the satisfaction o f NGC using Cavero's 
commercially available ZR20 software application [7.3].
7.2.2 Simulation of Modules within the Hierarchical Environment
Each o f the elements within the hierarchical system (ie: system computer, substation 
computers, protection clusters and data acquisition units) are simulated by a child 
process of the main application window. Each of the processes has its own data 
associated with it in locally defined databases, the contents of which may only be 
changed by:
•  communications with connected processes.
•  input via the GUI.
•  performance of power system analysis functions performed at different
levels within the hierarchy.
It should be noted that the power system module is also a child window of the main 
application window. Although this module does not form part o f the hierarchical 
protection system, its inclusion is necessary to generate the required data for input into 
the simulation. The functionality of each of the child processes, or modules within the 
hierarchical system, are outlined in more detail in the following sections.
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7.2.2.1 Power System Model
The power system is simulated using simple power system analysis software to generate 
the required data for input into the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection 
system simulation. The suite of programs enables the determination of the state of the 
power system in pre-fault and post-fault network conditions utilising load flow [7.4] 
and short circuit analysis [7.5]. The dimensions of the systems that can be modelled 
are highlighted in Table 7.1. Whilst these may be limited, they satisfy the 
requirements necessary to meet the project objectives. The power system analysis
software also enables modelling of tap-changing transformers and incorporates the
effects of a number of winding configurations including DDO, DZO, ZDO, YY 6 , DD6 , 
ZD 6 , DY1, YD1, YZ1, ZY1, DY11, YD11, YZ11 and ZY11 [7.6].
It should be noted that the load flow algorithms employ single phase analysis. It is 
therefore assumed that all load and transmission lines are balanced. In addition, only 
3-phase balanced faults can be applied to the system. Whilst this represents a 
limitation, especially as the single phase to earth fault is the most common, the 3-phase 
fault is generally regarded as the more severe and as such of more interest when 
considering protection setting.
7.2.2.2 System Computer Model
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The system computer oversees the entire integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system, being located in the control centre. The system computer has 
knowledge of the entire system obtained by communicating with the substation 
computers including:
•  current system topology derived from the circuit connectivity and 
knowledge of the current circuit breaker status.
•  current system load flow information including voltage magnitude and 
angle and branch flows.
•  physical parameters of all elements in the system.
Using this information, parameters for the reduced impedance models located in the 
substations are calculated and communicated to the substation.
7.2.2.3 Substation Host Computer
The station host computer communicates with the system computer to:
•  Receive information relating to the status of the system relevant to the
setting of the protection relays located in the substation.
•  Transmit information relating to the status of the system obtained from




The substation computer calculates the settings o f the protection relays in accordance 
with the required setting strategy.
7.2.2.4 Protection Clusters
The protection clusters are located at the bay level and comprise a number of 
protection relays associated with power system elements within the substation. They 
collate the data provided by the data acquisition units for use by the substation 
computer and utilise the data provided by the station computer to adjust their respective 
setting values. Based on the current information available to the relays a decision to 
operate or remain restrained is made.
There are many protection relays within power systems that would benefit from 
additional data derived via a hierarchical structure including both unit and non-unit 
types. Within this simulation of the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system, the modelling of protection relays has initially been limited to 
distance relays as this form of protection provides both main and backup protection 
features on the majority of feeders within the England and Wales transmission system. 
The modelled relay is a mho distance relay with operation determined utilising the
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phase comparator technique. The distance relay model enables visual representation 
o f the power system conditions presented to the relay in both pre-fault and post-fault 
network conditions. The input data presented to the distance relay model include the 
vector quantities:
•  pre-fault busbar voltage.
•  pre-fault branch power flow.
•  post-fault busbar voltages for a 3 phase fault.
•  post-fault branch currents for a 3 phase fault.
Dependent on the mode of operation, the relay may be set locally enabling the 
implementation o f a conventional protection system or remotely via the hierarchical 
structure. These settings include:
•  zone 1  setting.
•  zone 2  setting.
•  zone 3 forward setting.
•  zone 4 reverse setting.
•  zone 2  timer setting.
•  zone 3 timer setting.
•  line angle.
•  load angle.
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7.2.2.5 Data Acquisition Units
The data acquisition units perform the necessary control functions on their associated 
circuit breakers and gather information directly from the system which is passed to the 
protection clusters via optical fibre communications link. Within the simulation, there 
are two types o f data acquisition units, those associated with monitoring busbars, and 
those associated with monitoring branches and controlling their circuit breakers.
7.2.2.6 Information Transfer
The modules developed in the preceding sections have been developed as stand alone 
applications. However, to function in the hierarchical environment, each o f the 
modules must have the ability to communicate bi-directionally with other applications 
such that it may both receive and transmit data as required. In previous sections, it has 
been stated that each of the modules has been simulated by a child process. Each child 
process has knowledge of the other child processes to which it is connected. Following 
a change in data, in a given process, a discrete message is sent to all other processes 
to which that process is connected.
7.2.3 Data Management
Central to the simulation of the hierarchical systems is the efficient management of
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information. It is well known that power system monitoring and control requires the 
processing and storage of large amounts of data. In the simulation o f the hierarchical 
system the requirements for data storage are increased considerably by the need to store 
multiple copies of the same data at different levels within the hierarchy. To ensure the 
efficient management o f memory, memory is dynamically allocated.
7.3 Application for the Illustration of Power System Operating Conditions on 
Distance Protection Under Resistive Earth Faults
In chapter 6  it was shown how the impedance measured by distance relays is adversely 
affected by earth fault resistance. The residually compensated distance relay element 
has been simulated in software operating in a Microsoft Windows 3.1 environment. 
The software simulates the measured impedance by the relay, under changing earth 
fault resistance, for different user specified power system operating conditions. The 
performance of the relay for a number of characteristics, in addition to the adaptive 
characteristic, can visually be illustrated for the different system conditions. The 
application demonstrates the influence of power system operating conditions, for the 
double end fed feeder shown in Fig.6.1. The application is menu driven, with support 
dialog boxes for data entry. This allows the power system to easily be configured to 
the required form. The detailed functionality of the application is described in [7.7]. 
As with the adaptive setting application, this simulation has been validated to the 
satisfaction o f NGC using Cavero's ZR20 software application [7.3].
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CHAPTER 8
BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF INTEGRATED DIG ITAL 
HIERARCHICAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS
8.1 Introduction
The power supply system o f the United Kingdom is one o f the largest and most highly 
integrated in the world. The introduction or replacement o f equipment in the power 
system requires consideration of many factors, some o f those to be considered including 
quality, safety, environmental impact, community attitudes, labour management 
relationships, cash flow position, risks, system reliability, system availability, system 
maintainability, system operability, system flexibility, impact on personnel levels, training 
requirements, comparisons with competitors, impact on different units within the 
organisation, customers preferences, capital requirements and economic justification [ 8 . 1 ]. 
Some of these issues are easily quantifiable and the decision to invest in new equipment 
is easily justified. For example, consider the scenario in which protection equipment is 
placing constraints on the operation of the power system. Here, the constraint may be 
quantified, say in terms of lost revenue, as can the cost o f investment in a new protection 
scheme that eliminates the problem. The decision to invest in the new equipment will only 
proceed if  cost of the new protection system is less than the cost o f continuing to operate 
the system with the constraint over a defined period. Investment in other equipment
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requires more careful consideration as it provides benefits that are perhaps intangible and 
not so easily quantified.
This chapter describes the benefits and limitations o f integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection systems and justifies the decision to invest in such a system. This is 
undertaken in a framework that recognises that there is often more than one solution to 
engineering problems. The benefits and limitations o f integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection systems and alternative solutions are outlined by considering issues 
that power system operators are increasingly paying more attention to. It is shown that 
the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system has considerable benefits 
over the alternatives and makes a significant step forward to the realisation o f the totally 
integrated business system.
Economic considerations play an important part in decisions of investment alternatives. 
In relation to this work, the question remains as to whether the costs o f investment in a 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system are justified. A method of 
cost justification that compares the cost o f the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system against alternative solutions is outlined.
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8.2 Comparison of Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control and Protection 
Systems and Alternative Systems
8.2.1 Framework for Establishment of Benefits and Limitations of Alternative 
Schemes
Like all systems, to remain effective and provide services that the market requires they 
must continually evolve. This requires investment in new power plant, control equipment 
or protection schemes. Changes within the power industry have enabled private 
generating companies to emerge, requiring connection to the grid system of England and 
Wales. Power system operators must respond quickly to connect new generating stations 
and adapt the transmission system accordingly. The connection of new generating plant 
and the emergence of more complex transmission circuits, due to economic and 
environmental considerations, has meant that methods must be found to:
•  Make the system easier to manage.
•  Enable the system to respond more easily to changes in the power system
and adapt to expansion.
•  Enable the system to respond to changes in market demands quickly and 
efficiently.
•  Improve the integrity and quality o f supply.
•  Reduce costs of operation and replacement of equipment.
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•  Enhance performance.
•  Enable better utilisation of assets in the organisation, particularly 
expensive power equipment.
These issues may be addressed by investment in new equipment. Before investment takes 
place, it is necessary to formulate alternative solutions to address the issues, analyse the 
alternatives, and select a solution. The alternative solutions formulated are based on both 
conventional and digital solutions and include:
Solution A do nothing.
Solution B invest in a conventional stand-alone protection systems employing
traditional technology.
Solution C invest in a digital stand-alone protection systems employing smart 
technology.
Solution D invest in a conventional integrated hierarchical control and 
protection systems employing traditional technology.
Solution E invest in a integrated digital hierarchical control and protection
systems.
Solution F invest in power plant for system reinforcement.
The first o f the alternatives, Solution A, is the "do nothing" solution. This involves 
continuing to operate the system with the same equipment that is already installed. This
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solution provides a bench mark for comparison of investment proposals. It is important 
to recognise that the "do nothing" solution also has benefits and limitations when 
compared to alternative solutions. For example, whilst it does not have an investment 
cost, its performance may be lower and the costs associated with operation and 
maintenance may be higher.
The remaining solutions, Solutions B to F, require investment in equipment. In Solutions 
B, the current equipment is replaced by a conventional system with the same principles 
o f operation. As such, the protection remains operating in a stand-alone configuration. 
Solution C is similar to Solution B, in that the relays remain stand-alone. However, the 
latest digital relays employing enhanced signal processing techniques and smart 
technology are used. Solutions D and E form an integrated environment using 
conventional and digital relays respectively. The final alternative, Solution F, is very 
different. This alternative is included as one of the reasons for investment may be that the 
existing power plant is being utilised to its maximum allowable potential that current 
conventional protection system performance allows. Thus, instead o f investing in 
improving control and protection system performance, to obtain further utilisation o f the 
power plant, an alternative could be to invest in additional power plant operated at the 
current allowable levels of utilisation.
The decision to invest in either o f these alternatives will depend on the benefits and 
limitations of each system and these must be analysed in detail. Key issues that relate to
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the alternative solutions have been identified that provide both tangible and intangible 
benefits to the power system operators. Each o f these is discussed in the following 
sections, where relevant, and a comparison is made between the alternative solutions.
8.2.2 Installation Costs
The majority of equipment for the protection, monitoring and control o f the power system 
is located in the substation. In the conventional system the protection, monitoring and 
control equipment, employing conventional (Solution B and D) or smart technology 
(Solution C), is located in a central switching room. Wiring from the transducers must 
come through the switch yard to the switching room. This has a number o f disadvantages 
as:
•  large amounts o f wiring are required to interface the power system to 
functions being performed in the switching room.
•  the wiring is subject to the hostile switch yard environment.
•  each substation is different and a large proportion of work needs to be 
done at the substation when installing and commissioning equipment.
•  complex decision logic requires large quantities o f hardwired logic relays.
In contrast, in the digital integrated hierarchical control and protection system substation 
(Solution E):
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•  data acquisition units are located close to the transducers such that wiring 
is considerably reduced, the interface to the remainder o f the system being 
done by a single digital communications link.
•  advanced digital techniques with error correction using fibre optic cables 
can avoid interference in the hostile switch yard environment.
•  the highly modular approach of the integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection system enables the majority o f equipment testing to be 
undertaken before leaving the factory.
•  complex decision logic is easily accommodated in software.
The costs associated with plant reinforcement, Solution F, are discussed in more detail in 
section 8.2.5. However, for completeness it should be noted that the costs o f power plant 
reinforcement are far greater than those associated with the installation o f protection and 
control equipment.
It should also be noted that the "do nothing" alternative, Solution A, has no installation 
cost as the equipment is already in place.
8.2.3 Flexibility
Power systems are never designed and constructed in their ultimate form. Changes in 
demand and addition of generation require system reinforcement and corresponding
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changes to the protection and control system. In conventional control and protection 
systems, employing either smart or traditional technology (Solutions A, B, C and D), 
these changes are difficult to accommodate. However, the modular approach and 
mechanisms by which the additional data required on expansion are accommodated in a 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection systems (Solution E) make it flexible 
enough to facilitate these changes with a minimum of effort and expense. Importantly, the 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection systems enable evolutionary 
incorporation into old systems to avoid excessive expense.
8.2.4 System Utilisation
Modem power systems operate far closer to stability and thermal limits than was the case 
a number of years ago. To facilitate this comprehensive monitoring and control is 
essential to enable detailed analysis and modelling to determine if  re-configuration and 
readjustment is required. In addition, protection, control and monitoring equipment must 
meet more stringent performance criteria. The integrated control and protection systems 
(Solutions D and E), by virtue of integration of information, provides a convenient 
framework in which this can be undertaken. Conventional control systems, using SCADA 
systems, also enable this. To a limited extent, conventional digital protection systems 
employing smart technology (Solution C) will enable improved utilisation as a result of 
improved performance achieved by more detailed analysis of existing information. 
However, conventional protection systems, employing traditional technology (Solution
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B), would not enable improved system utilisation.
8.2.5 System Reinforcement
The cost of investing in power plant together with increased emphasis on environmental 
issues has meant that utilities are increasingly trying to defer system reinforcement o f the 
transmission network resulting in the network being run far closer to thermal and stability 
limits as outlined in the previous section. It is important to recognise that the cost of 
introducing new control and protection systems (Solutions B to E), are small in 
comparison to the investment, say the £0.5M to £1.0M per km of double circuit 400 kV 
transmission line, required for reinforcement (Solution F).
8.2.6 System Management
In complex systems, the issues o f management become far more complex. To keep out- 
of-merit operation of generation plant to a minimum, it is essential that maintenance and 
refurbishment programmes for the entire system coordinate with one another. In addition, 
these should be minimised. In conventional systems, maintenance is performed on a 
regular basis (Solutions A, B and C). In the integrated systems (Solutions D and E) the 
integration of information coupled with the inherent self monitoring capability o f digital 
relays (Solution E) enables optimised determination of maintenance requirements based 
on say statistical information. In addition, the integrated digital control and protection
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system incorporates comprehensive information displays together with event and 
waveform recorders to monitor and log events to enable identification o f past and future 
problem areas.
8.2.7 Unattended Operation
Some substations are situated in remote areas. To avoid having on-site operators, 
coupled with the need for systems to respond quickly, requires equipment that can be 
remotely interrogated and controlled. In addition, should communications fail, the remote 
substation should have the necessary intelligence to operate independently. Both o f the 
proposed hierarchical control and protection systems, using either conventional or digital 
technology, are capable of performing this (Solutions D and E).
8.2.8 Redundancy
There is considerable commonality in both input and output quantities for performing 
monitoring, control and protection functions. In the conventional control and protection 
systems each of the functions is undertaken by a separate redundant sets of transducers - 
say one set for monitoring, one set for control and one set for protection (Solutions A, 
B and C). The integrated environment (Solutions D and E) reduces the redundancy by 
exploiting the commonality of information between functions such that there will be one 
set o f transducers to enable integrated monitoring, control and protection of the system
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whilst maintaining levels o f reliability.
8.2.9 Complexity
In the conventional system, a large proportion o f the protection functions are performed 
by discrete, stand-alone devices (Solutions A, B and C). These perform simple tasks and 
act autonomously. The addition o f communications links to these and the changing of 
their functionality adds considerable complexity to the system, as in the case o f integrated 
systems, and increases the number o f modes o f failure (Solutions D and E).
8.2.10 Technology
The technology used in the conventional control and protection system (Solutions A and 
B) has evolved over the last century. These methods are tried and tested and as such well 
proven. The concepts o f digital relaying (Solutions C and E) and integrated systems 
(Solution D and E) from which hierarchical control and protection systems are derived 
only came into existence in the 1970s. More importantly, their application to power 
systems is recent and there still remains a large body o f work to be undertaken, some o f 
which the technology does not exist for. To fully exploit the benefits o f integrated 
systems devices whose functionality can be adapted and optimised on-line via digital 
communications link must be developed.
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8.2.11 Availability of Information
The control and protection actions are directly correlated to the information which they 
are supplied with to make the decision of what action they should take. The stand-alone 
devices only have available to them conventional input measurands and as such the 
performance can only attain a specific level (Solution A and B). By using enhanced signal 
processing techniques for parameter estimation and system identification extra information 
may be derived from the conventional input measurands and the decision action may be 
improved (Solution C). Artificial intelligence techniques may also be used for extracting 
further information from the locally available information. Further performance 
enhancements and additional functionality may only be achieved by supplying the control 
and protection devices with additional information via the integrated control and 
protection system (Solutions D and E). For the protection system, these performance 
enhancements may prove particularly beneficial if  say there was an area in which the 
occurrence o f high resistance earth faults was proving influential in the integrity o f the 
power system operation. Whilst the attainment o f 100% performance is desirable, the 
economic and practical implications must be carefully analysed with regard to necessity 
and complexity. Where protection mal-operation leads to statistically significant risk o f 
loss of supply, a lost revenue o f £2 per kWh lost can be assumed.
The availability o f this information w ill also create other uses for it. This could be 
commercially made available to other parties for their use.
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8.2.12 Rationalisation
Fault initiated automatic switching schemes can be used to prevent overload, maintain 
dynamic stability, maintain transient stability, or maintain voltage stability. These schemes 
are increasingly being adopted in parts of the system where capacity is being stretched to 
the limit or where delayed reinforcement has led to particularly weak connections (ie: 
delaying Solution F). In these areas protection arrangements are complex and there is 
interaction between the control and protection schemes in the locality. The environment 
available in the integrated system enables a rational approach to the optimisation o f fault 
initiated automatic switching and protection schemes. In a more abstract sense, the 
integrated control and protection system enables a more rational and effective flow of 
information throughout the organisation (Solutions D and E).
8.3 Cost Comparison Analysis
In section 8.2.1, it was stated that before investment takes place, it is necessary to 
formulate alternative solutions to address the issues, analyse the alternatives, and select 
a solution. The solutions were formulated and qualitatively analysed in sections 8.2.2 to 
8.2.12. Whilst qualitative analysis is important, it is equally important to quantify in 
economic terms each of the costs associated with each o f the alternatives.
In evaluating each of the different alternatives, an approach that compares a number of
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alternatives over a period of time is advocated. This is necessary as each alternative may 
have very different requirements o f initial investment and recurring operational expenses. 
These issues are further complicated by the time value o f money [8.1] in which money 
available now has a different value to money available at an alternative date. A step-by- 
step procedure is recommended for evaluating each plan [8.2] as summarised in Fig.8 .1.
In this procedure, an area is chosen which requires development to alleviate limitations 
o f existing equipment or replace equipment that has exceeded its lifetime. Alternative 
plans must be developed that meet the requirements o f the utility. A study period must 
then be chosen over which the benefits and limitations o f each o f the plans is to be 
evaluated. The anticipated changes in the area must be projected over the study period. 
Using each of the proposed plans, the operating and maintenance costs for each year must 
be calculated incorporating the phasing in o f the new systems such that the cost benefits 
can be shown. Each o f the alternatives must then be evaluated by deriving the cost 
relative to the benefit gained and then compared with one another. In evaluating the 
alternatives it is important to quantify all costs including not only those associated with 
operation and maintenance but also those that are less tangible:
•  Feeder Failure rate per year per mile.
•  Line crew rate per man-hour.
•  Savings introduced by improved performance.
•  Savings introduced by improved availability o f information.
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•  Savings introduced in generation by using generation production costing 
programs.
The costs of introducing an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system 
depend on the extent to which integrated arrangements and digital control have already 
been installed at the relevant substations. In the England and Wales system, the necessary 
system data and central computing power is already available at the national and area 
control centres. The communications channels to the control centres for hierarchical 
control and protection are becoming available. Assuming the adoption o f an integrated 
substation, the main costs o f introducing the hierarchical control and protection 
arrangements are those required for the development and commissioning o f the necessary 
software. This cost is not trivial in view o f the complexity o f the logic and the overriding 
need to demonstrate software reliability. The benefits that the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system will show are in three principle areas:
•  Power System Investment: The need for generation, transmission and 
distribution system reinforcement can be deferred. Conventional control, 
protection and monitoring equipment will be displaced by investment in 
the integrated system enabling flexible modification and addition to the 
system.
•  Power System Operation and Maintenance: Interruptions will be 
minimised by reducing the time for the location o f faults and avoiding the
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need for unscheduled visits to substations. Commonality in hardware will 
make trouble shooting easier. This in turn w ill reduce losses in revenue. 
The quality o f supply to the customer w ill improve by reduction in 
prolonged outages and improved reliability. Reduced repair and 
maintenance together with optimum operation o f the system w ill reduce 
operational costs.
•  Improved Operation: Comprehensive information, such as sequence of 
events, w ill be available to the engineer for analysis. This will enable 
improved planning and response during emergencies. Mal-operations will 
be reduced by the adaptive capability o f relays enabling settings to be 
easily changed and flexibility in defining relay operational characteristics 
and functionality.
The area that has been chosen for development is the North Wales 400 / 275 kV network. 
Using data published in [8.3] together with the assumptions listed below, a comparison 
o f costs has been undertaken.
•  the costs o f operation and maintenance for the "do nothing" alternative 
(Solution A) are the same as those for the new conventional stand-alone 
system (Solution B).
•  the costs of transformer, busbar and shunt reactor protection are the same 
as those for line protection in the stand-alone investment alternatives
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(Solutions B and C) as no data is available for this equipment.
•  the factors associated with the reduction in maintenance costs and the 
reduction in unscheduled visits to substations for the stand-alone 
alternatives (Solutions A, B and C) have been assumed as no data is 
available.
•  the cost of power plant reinforcement (Solution F) has been discarded as 
it is far more expensive than the other alternatives.
Based on a study period o f 2 0  years and using estimates o f costs [8.3] the cumulative 
costs for each alternative, assuming no increase in the cost o f operation and maintenance 
and no consideration for the cost o f finance, are illustrated in Fig. 8.2.
Fig.8.2 assumed that there was no cost associated with borrowing for investment. 
However, finance does have a cost. I f  it is assumed that an initial amount P is borrowed 
at an interest rate of i % a year and that at the end o f each year an amount R is paid back 
for n years until the dept is repaid, to ensure capital recovery then the amount R repaid 
each year is given by [ 8 .1 ]:
R = P. i.( i + if
(1 + if - 1
8.1)
I f  the cost o f finance is incorporated in the comparison and it is assumed that an amount
181
Chapter 8: Benefits and Limitations of Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control and
Protection Systems
to cover the cost o f the investment (excluding operation and maintenance) at an interest 
rate o f 10% for 10 years the cumulative costs o f each alternative are shown in Fig.8 .3. 
The cost o f finance is highlighted by the disconinuity in all curves between the tenth and 
eleventh years o f the study when repayment o f the loan is completed.
BothFig.8.2 and Fig.8.3 have assumed that there is no increase in the costs o f operation 
and maintenance. However, this is not the case. To incorporate the cost o f operation and 
maintenance, assume that each year the costs o f operation and maintenance increase by 
i % every year and the current costs are C. It can be shown that in n years time the future 
cost, F, w ill be [8.1]:
F  = C. 8.2)
I f  the cost o f operation and maintenance increases are incorporated into the comparison 
and it is assumed that the associated costs are increasing at a rate o f 1 0 % per year, the 
cumulative costs o f each alternative are shown in Fig. 8.4.
This final illustration, Fig.8.4, shows that the investment in new equipment only starts to 
yield benefits over the "do nothing" alternative after about 15 years. At this time both of 
the digital alternatives (Solutions C and E) become more economic than the "do nothing" 
scenario. It is also at this time that the cumulative costs o f investing in the integrated
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digital control and protection system (Solution E) as opposed to investment in the stand­
alone digital system employing smart technology (Solution C) shows dividends. It should 
be noted that both conventional protection systems (solutions B and D) never become 
economically viable.
8.4 Conclusions
The long term investment in the integrated digital control and protection system provides 
the most attractive solution o f the alternative schemes proposed. This chapter has 
demonstrated the benefits and limitations o f the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system over alternatives using both quantitative and qualitative arguments.
It should be noted that whilst this chapter has qualitatively outlined the benefits and 
limitations, and quantitatively compared the costs, of integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection systems relative to alternative solutions, it remains to be established if  the 
cost to benefit analysis also indicates that investment in the integrated hierarchical control 
and protection system is favourable. This has not been undertaken within this work.
This chapter has, however, shown that the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system does provides a significant step forward in the realisation o f the 
integrated business solution. In the long term, the potential benefits o f the integrated 
solution are not in doubt due to its impact on installation cost, flexibility, utilisation,
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reinforcement, management, redundancy, reliability, rationalisation, enhanced functionality 
and widespread availability o f information. What is o f far more concern is how the utility 
moves from the system o f today to the integrated system o f the future and it is this that 
w ill be addressed in the following chapter.
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Figure 8.1 Rational Analysis of Alternative Solutions
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Figure 8.2 Illustration of the Cost of Alternative Solutions Ignoring the Cost of Finance and Annual Increases in
Operation and Maintenance Costs
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Figure 8.4 Illustration of the Cost of Alternative Solutions Including the Cost of Finance and Annual Increases in
Operation and Maintenance Costs
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CHAPTER 9
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEGRATED DIG ITAL 
HIERARCHICAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS
9.1 Introduction
Developments in digital electronics and communications have focused considerable 
attention on the application of this technology to power system control and protection. 
A wide range of microprocessor-based products are now commercially available for 
monitoring, control and relaying. New tools and concepts that exploit the greater 
flexibility and efficiency provided by microprocessor and communications technology, 
such as the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system, have also 
emerged. However, the power system already incorporates a large complex infrastructure 
for performing the control and protection functions. To exploit the benefits o f the new 
technology whilst introducing them in a cost effective manner provides one of todays 
greatest challenges [9.1].
This chapter starts by considering, in abstract terms, the steps necessary for the 
implementation of a integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system. A large 
proportion of business capital is already invested in control and protection equipment, 
much of which still performs its function correctly and has a number o f years o f its lifetime
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remaining. The enhancement necessary to the existing system and the method by which 
it should evolve to the new systems are outlined. The implications to computer hardware, 
software and communications are outlined. The technology o f today still has its 
limitations and the requirements for developments and advancements are outlined. The 
chapter concludes by outlining some of the social issues that also need to be considered 
when introducing a new system.
9.2 Steps in the Implementation of the Integrated Digital Hierarchical Control 
and Protection System
The decision to invest in a integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system 
should not be taken lightly. It should be treated in exactly the same manner as the 
investment o f any other piece of capital equipment. As in the introduction of any 
equipment, a rational approach incorporating feasibility study, requirements analysis, 
system design and implementation should be undertaken [9.2], The objectives o f each of 
these stages in the process are briefly outlined.
•  Feasibility Study: The feasibility study provides an assessment of the 
business needs for the investment in the system and should conclude by 
stating whether the investment is justified. The motives for investment in 
the system and the main application areas should be outlined. This will 
enable evaluation o f the benefits o f acquiring a system and the cost
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involved. It has been the purpose o f this document to address these 
issues.
•  Requirements Analysis: Following the feasibility study, abstract
requirements of the system will have emerged. Using this to provide a 
framework, a detailed specification should be drawn up defining the major 
objectives of the system, the applications for which the system will be used 
and how it will be expanded upon. The hardware requirements for visual 
display units, printers, storage, users, communication facilities and 
environment, and a timetable for implementation must be defined.
•  Design: This incorporates the detailed design o f the hardware and the 
organisation may wish this to be undertaken by external companies. In 
this case suppliers should be invited to tender and proposals evaluated 
considering the costs o f hardware, software, support and training.
•  Implementation: In parallel with the design, the organisation needs to 
carefully plan how the new system is going to successfully take over from 
the old system. This not only requires the resolution o f technical issues 
but also human resource issues such as training and acceptance by the 
employees of the new system. On supply of the system, it must be 
configured and undergo considerable field tests before it can go on-line. 
Importantly, there must be a transfer period from the existing methods to 
the new systems.
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9.3 Technological Issues in the Introduction of the Hierarchical Control and 
Protection System
9.3.1 General
The means and principles available for the control and protection o f the power system of 
today have been outlined in chapter 2. The structure of an integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system has been outlined in chapter 4. The implementation of such 
a system requires careful consideration incorporating not only the functions that it is 
required to do today but also how it can evolve to new systems as the power system 
develops and matures. It is important to recognise that the integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system only integrates the control and protection functions. In 
time these systems will evolve to form a complete business system with all functions 
within the organisation integrated. To ensure that flexibility is built into the system to 
accommodate continuous development, a detailed knowledge o f what thinking the 
business needs, what information is required in order to do this thinking, and what 
information must be supplied to the company on the basis of this.
The introduction of integrated systems will also have a considerable impact on the 
organisational structure. At the heart o f introducing integrated systems is the flow of 
information. The departmental view of organisations must be discarded in favour of an 
approach aiming for the optimised flow of information through the organisation. This
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information must satisfy the requirements of the users so that:
•  power system operators can use the information to run the system in a 
safe, secure and economic manner.
•  protection engineers can easily analyse the performance of relays.
•  maintenance departments interested in finding out the time in service and 
number of operations o f plant can easily do so.
•  accounting departments easily know how much energy has been purchased 
and sold.
Importantly, the system must be implemented such that it ensures profitability.
9.3.2 Implementation
The existing system provides a framework from which to develop the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system. The practical implementation of the integrated 
digital hierarchical control and protection system requires evolution from the existing 
system. It will not come into existance following a "big bang". Rather, as and when 
existing equipment exceeds its lifetime or it becomes beneficial to do so, the integrated 
digital hierarchical control and protection system will more likely come into existance.
Steps in the implementation of the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection
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system are summarised in Fig.9.1. As the current system must evolve to the new 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system, the first step in the 
implementation must be the formulation o f company policy that states that the long term 
objective is to move towards such a system. Importantly, the management must support 
these objectives by recognising why such a system is necessary. Based on this, all future 
investment proposals in the control and protection system must be geared towards 
realisation of the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system.
On completion of this, the practical problems of incorporating the hierarchical control and 
protection system into the existing system must be addressed. A large proportion of 
protection and control devices are stand-alone and function independently. These devices 
still provide adequate functionality and are within their lifetimes. The ideal integrated 
digital hierarchical control and protection system requires access to all devices for efficient 
monitoring, optimisation and control. It is recognised that it would be impractical to 
undertake this at one time due to the financial implications. However, when the incentive 
o f replacing the existing equipment with new digital equipment with communications 
features, due to the limitations on operating constraints and quality, then they will be 
replaced. Initially, the new digital control and protection devices will remain operating 
as stand-alone devices exploiting their enhanced performance made available by the latest 
signal processing and artificial intelligence techniques. These devices will then be 
connected together and interfaced to the regional control centres via a substation 
computer when:
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•  the proportion of these devices in each substation has increased.
•  higher levels o f performance, available only through access to further
information available either within the substation or external to the 
substation, are required.
•  the benefits o f information integration outweigh the costs.
The necessary system data and computing power is already available at the national and 
area control centres. However, it does have a number of limitations and enhancements 
that are required to introduce the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection 
system.
•  Development of EMS: The EMS is geared to power system control. The 
data available through SCADA must be made available for the 
optimisation o f all protection and control functions.
•  Development of Software: The optimisation of protection relay 
performance and the rationalisation of fault initiated automatic switching 
will require the development and commissioning o f software at the control 
centres. This is not a trivial matter due to the complexities involved and 
the overriding need to demonstrate software reliability. This will require 
substantial investment.
•  Data Monitoring: Central to extracting benefits out o f the hierarchical 
system is the widespread availability of reliable information. This
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information must be gathered via transducers and checked for integrity 
using state estimation techniques. On loss o f certain sensors, the 
information currently available for state estimation can make the system 
unobservable such that the state o f the system cannot be recreated. This 
must be overcome.
•  Communications Infrastructure: The communications infrastructure 
currently comprises dedicated links for both protection and control. At 
present there is a minimum of one data channel and one voice channel 
from the area control centres to each substation. Dedicated inter­
substation communications links for protection are also provided. Whilst 
these are sufficient to provide the monitoring, protection and control, 
these need to be increased to accommodate the additional information 
flow in the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system. 
With time these need to evolve to the new computer network 
methodologies for LANs and WANs. It is important to recognise that 
wide area public communications infrastructures are still developing and 
still use circuit switched technology. These will eventually evolve to the 
integrated services digital network (ISDN) providing both data and voice 
communications channels.
As this happens, the hierarchical infrastructure will emerge. It should be noted that in 
implementing the system the following should be considered:
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•  Maintaining Supply: The disruption of supply to customers can have 
significant financial implications. The new system must be introduced and 
take over from the existing system in a manner that maintains the integrity 
of supply.
•  Standardisation: Standard methods must be used in the design and 
configuration of control and protection schemes.
•  Expanding the System: Power systems are continually evolving. The 
practicalities of expanding the system and ensuring all relevant databases 
are updated within the hierarchical system whilst ensuring satisfactoiy 
levels of reliability must be carefully evaluated.
•  Relay Adaptation: In adapting the relay, the relay may only have a finite 
range o f adaptability. For example, only a limited number o f stepped 
settings may be available for setting adaptation. The algorithms for 
calculation o f the new setting must take this into considertion.
•  Interface Between Conventional and Integrated Digital System: 
During the evolution of the existing system to the integrated digital 
hierarchical system, scenarios will arise in which information in the 
existing system that has not been upgraded is required in the new system 
and vice versa. Here it will be necessary to interface the two systems.
As the infrastructure of the hierarchical control and protection system develops, further 
developments in software tools to fully exploit the information available will emerge.
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These developments will continue until all functions within the organisation have been 
integrated, leading to the realisation the o f totally integrated business solution.
9.3.4 Requirements for Developments and Advancements In Technology
The history of power systems has been one of continuous development. To fully exploit 
the benefits to be gained by the introduction o f the Hierarchical Integrated Control and 
Protection System, further developments are necessary in the following areas:
•  Control and Protection Devices: Conventional control and protection 
deuces have pre-specified functionality. To exploit the full benefits o f the 
hierarchical control and protection system, devices must emerge whose 
functionality can be on-line adapted and optimised via digital 
communications links.
•  A rtific ia l Intelligence: A large proportion of functions within the 
organisation still require intervention by the human. The complete 
automation of these functions within the organisation requires that they be 
performed by the computer. Further work remains to be done in the use 
of these systems for the rationalisation of information and the automation 
o f the decision process.
•  Interfaces: The interface between the human operator and the computer 
has come a long way since the introduction o f the computer with punch
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card input and output. However, research in human factors engineering 
must continue to improve the integration o f the human and the computer 
for more efficient and productive interaction.
•  Information Integrity: The integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system is only as good as the data that is put into the system. 
Methods must be found to check and correct data within all databases to 
ensure high reliability operation o f the system. For example, in adaptively 
setting a protection relay, the data upon which the new setting is 
calculated is subject to tolerances, say in transducers. It must be 
demonstrated that the new setting offers satisfactory levels of performance 
under these conditions. Furthermore, on changing the setting, it must be 
demonstrated that the new setting downloaded to the relay is the required 
setting and no corruption has taken place.
9.4 Social Issues in the Introduction of the Integrated Digital Hierarchical 
Control and Protection System
The increased levels of automation, afforded by the introduction of the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system, have considerable social impact throughout the 
organisation from top management to unskilled labour.
Fewer but more specialised people will deal with complex problems aided by the computer
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and sound management and scientific principles. This will result in the thinning out of 
middle management and considerable changes in the company structure. The introduction 
o f automated systems will also move management culture. There will be a reduction in 
the concern with incentives to employees to increase productivity and a corresponding 
increase in the ability to maintain and extract better utilisation of equipment. This will 
result in the emergence of managers who have a broad combination o f social, 
technological and economic skills.
The introduction of the system will bring about economies in labour and far reaching 
changes in the pattern of employment. The employees must be consulted about the effects 
of changes in working conditions. The need for unskilled labour is reduced, some existing 
skills being rendered obsolete. So far as reasonably practical, the workforce should be 
ensured that redundancy will be catered for by wastage and retirement.
The rate of technological development will be such that all levels o f staff may need to be 
periodically retrained. The new system will place considerable demands for a high 
technical culture. This will require investment by the organisations, not only in facilities 
for providing training but also investment in the employees within the organisation. 
However, it is important to recognise that the development o f automated systems will not 
depend on the computer technology but on staff familiar with the processes that make up 
the business they are involved with.
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People w ill always resist change. Those responsible for the introduction of the new 
system must consult all employees who will be effected. It has been found that the change 
is accepted if  they are consulted and made to feel part o f the process. More importantly, 
a great deal can be learned and the organisation can benefit from the feedback recieved.
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The objectives o f the research, as outlined in Chapter 1, were to simulate an integrated 
digital hierarchical control and protection system and to evaluate the potential benefits and 
limitations of introducing such a system to the North Wales 400 kV network forming part 
o f the transmission system managed by NGC.
The above objectives have been achieved by:
(i) the development of software which simulates a hierarchical protection system 
based on the North Wales 400 kV network, and adaptively optimises the 
functionality o f distance relay, and
(ii) by production of this document which describes integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection systems and their application to optimise the functionality 
o f distance relays by adaptive techniques.
Two techniques are described in the report and demonstrated by the software for
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adaptation of the functionality of distance relays. The first technique adapts the zone 
settings of distance relays and the second technique adapts their characteristic such that 
the fault selectivity o f the distance relays are improved. The potential benefits of 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection systems have also been described, 
together with the particular benefits and limitations o f their application to distance 
schemes.
The objectives of the research have been met.
10.2 Principal Findings
The following is a summary of the conclusions drawn from the work:
(i) The overall financial cost o f integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection systems are less than contemperary conventional types of schemes. 
This is examined in Chapter 8 . Notwithstanding this cost advantage, there are 
additional benfits associated with integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection schemes which would result in better asset utilisation and system 
management.
(ii) Using an integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system, the 
work shows that techniques to adapt zone settings o f distance relays and also to
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adapt their characteristic shape as the prevailing power system conditions change, 
were possible. The work also shows that this on-line adaptation would improve 
the performance of protection for certain fault conditions. This is demonstrated 
in Chapters 5 and 6 .
(iii) The software developed satisfactorily demonstrates the workings of the 
adaptive techniques. The theoretical basis of the software was validated by NGC 
to their satisfaction using independently produced software.
(iv) The steps necessary to implement an integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection system require careful planning. An approach that enables the 
existing system to evolve to the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system has been discussed in Chapter 9.
(v) Further work needs to be undertaken in the application of integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system to power systems. This is discussed in 
section 10.4.
10.3 Summary
Whilst the control and protection systems already have high levels of performance, the 
power system of the United Kingdom is continually evolving and becoming more
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complex. Within this changing environment, techniques that maintain, and if  necessary 
increase, the performance o f the power system whilst making the system flexible, 
economic, responsive to changes, easier to manage and better able to utilise the assets of 
the organisation, are of considerable interest. The computer integrated system, by 
integrating information, provides a mechanism for this.
To provide a framework on which to base the research, the power system o f the United 
Kingdom has been discussed. The concepts behind computer integrated systems and their 
organisation in the solution o f large complex problems have been outlined. It has been 
shown that the computer integrated system arranged hierarchically should be employed 
in the solution of large problems such as that o f a national power system. The 
functionality of the decentralised computing resources has been outlined in abstract terms. 
Supporting the decentralised computing resources are communications, database and 
artificial intelligence technologies. The principles behind these technologies have been 
discussed.
The integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system provides a mechanism 
for exploiting the benefits o f the computer integrated systems for the control and 
protection of power systems. The increasing need for fault initiated automatic control 
switching for the alleviation of plant overload and stability problems have been discussed. 
The limitations of conventional protection systems have been discussed and the use of the 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system for the optimisation of
206
Chapter 10: Conclusions
protection performance by way of introducing adaptive protection have been discussed.
The use o f adaptive protection systems for the optimisation o f the performance of the 
functionality o f relays has been outlined. The functionality may be altered via two 
principle means: the setting and the characteristic. The use o f the integrated digital 
hierarchical control and protection system for adaptively changing the setting o f distance 
relays has been outlined. Various methods have been discussed including methods using 
the National Grid Company setting strategy and methods optimising the reliability o f the 
protection, the latter method considering the impact o f settings on dependability and 
security. The performance of each of the methods has been shown. The use o f the 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system for optimising the 
performance of distance protection under the influence of high resistance earth faults by 
using relays with the capability of changing their characteristics has been outlined.
To illustrate these effects two applications have been developed, one for the adaptive 
setting of protection relays and one for characteristic adaptation. The applications have 
been developed to operate in a Windows 3.1 environment and visually show the user the 
benefits and limitations of adapting the setting and the characteristic. Results have been 
presented that validate the software and provide a framework for discussing developments 
that are required to enable protection engineers to evaluate the performance of protection.
The introduction of new systems to the power system requires careful analysis of the
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benefits and limitations o f introducing the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system. These have been considered with respect to alternative solutions and 
in the long term the potential benefits of the integrated environment have been considered 
with respect to:
•  Installation Cost.
•  Flexibility.
•  Asset Utilisation.




•  Availability o f Information.
It should be recognised that for businesses to fully exploit the benefits of automation, this 
requires not only the automation o f functions o f the control and protection but also the 
automation of all other business functions and how these functions are integrated. Whilst 
the integrated digital hierarchical control and protection system only integrates the control 
and protection function, it provides a significant step forward in the realisation o f the 
totally integrated business solution.
Whilst the long term potential of computer integrated systems are not in doubt, what is
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o f far more concern is how the utility moves from the power system o f today to the 
integrated system o f the future. It is recognised that the power system already 
incorporates a large complex infrastructure for performing the control and protection 
functions. The steps necessary in the implementation o f the integrated digital hierarchical 
control and protection system and in particular, the enhancements that need to be added 
to the existing infrastructure are outlined.
10.4 Further Work
There is scope for further work in the application o f integrated digital hierarchical control 
and protection systems to power systems. Before an adaptive hierarchical distance 
relaying scheme can be implemented further work needs to be undertaken in at least two 
areas:
(i) Relay Update Frequency / Response to Change: In an adaptive relay, 
the functionality of the device is updated to reflect current power system 
conditions. However, to ensure the integrity o f the protection system, it 
remains to be established how often the relays require updating to give the 
required performance.
(ii) Failure: Should any part o f the integrated digital hierarchical control and 
protection system fail, in particular the communications systems, it remains
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to be established how the relays would operate and what their 
performance would be.
The improvement of operational intertripping is another obvious area for exploitation by 
integrated digital hierarchical control and protection systems. Actual work in this area 
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APPENDIX A
NORTH WALES POWER SYSTEM OPERATING CONDITIONS AND DATA
This appendix details the power system data and operating conditions for the North Wales 
System depicted in Fig.5.1. The parameters for the system are presented in Tables A. 1.1 
to A. 1.4 for busbars, transmission lines, transformers and generators respectively. It 
should be noted that additional equivalent generators have been included in Table A. 1.4 
to incorporate the effects of the rest of the grid. The power system operating conditions 
correspond to the 1994 / 95 winter peak data. Busbar, transmission line and transformer 
load flow data are presented in Tables A .2.1 to A .2.3. Using this information it is 
possible to derive the faulted network conditions, adaptively set the relays, and analyse 
the performance. The volume of this additional data prohibits incorporation in this 
documentis. However, it is available in reference [A .l].
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1 LEG-01 DEE-01 0.00052 0.00508 0.15822
2 LEG-01 TRA-01 0.00183 0.01464 0.44702
3 DEE-01 PEN-01 0.00095 0.01342 0.53661
4 DEE-01 PEN-01 0.00095 0.01342 0.53661
5 DEE-01 CAP-01 0.00014 0.00196 0.07840
6 DEE-01 CAP-02 0.00014 0.00196 0.07844
7 DEE-01 TRA-01 0.00189 0.01493 0.46292
8 DEE-01 DAI-01 0.00145 0.01147 0.35550
9 DEE-01 DAI-01 0.00145 0.01146 0.35529
1 0 PEN-01 TRA-01 0.00104 0.00867 1.40000
1 1 PEN-01 DIN-01 0.00007 0.00108 2.51500
1 2 PEN-01 DIN-01 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0.00139 1.47780
13 PEN-01 WYL-01 0.00042 0.00599 0.23946
14 PEN-01 WYL-01 0.00042 0.00599 0.23946
15 TRA-02 FFE-01 0.00086 0.00296 0.03014
16 TRA-02 FFE-01 0.00086 0.00296 0.02080
17 BIR-01 CAP-03 0.00077 0.00652 0.04128
18 FRO-01 CAP-06 0.00046 0.00647 0.05935
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1 LEG-01 LEG-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01919 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
2 DEE-01 DEE-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08183 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
3 DEE-01 DEE-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08183 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
4 PEN-01 PEN-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08292 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
5 PEN-01 PEN-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08321 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
6 TRA-01 TRA-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01665 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
7 TRA-01 TRA-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01547 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
8 TRA-02 TRA-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.12408 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
9 TRA-02 TRA-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.12250 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 TRA-02 TRA-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09712 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 TRA-02 TRA-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09837 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 TRA-02 TRA-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09739 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
13 TRA-02 TRA-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09647 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
14 FFE-01 FFE-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09811 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
15 FFE-01 FFE-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09700 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
16 DIN-01 DIN-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05156 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
17 DIN-01 DIN-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05123 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
18 DIN-01 DIN-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05123 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
19 DIN-01 DIN-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05123 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 DIN-01 DIN-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05156 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
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2 1 DIN-01 DIN-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.05156 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 WYL-01 WYL-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.04795 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
23 WYL-01 WYL-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.02763 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
24 WYL-01 WYL-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.04751 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
25 WYL-01 WYL-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.02763 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
26 WYL-01 WYL-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08591 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
27 WYL-01 WYL-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08636 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
28 WYL-01 WYL-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09077 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
29 CAP-01 CAP-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01600 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
30 CAP-01 CAP-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01684 0.08000
31 CAP-02 CAP-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01682 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
32 CAP-04 CAP-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08522 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
33 CAP-04 CAP-08 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08333 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
34 CAP-05 CAP-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08333 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
35 CAP-05 CAP-08 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08355 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
36 CAP-05 CAP-08 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08478 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
37 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.12833 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
38 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.12767 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
39 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08438 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
40 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.08438 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
41 CAP-02 CAP-05 0.00019 0.01597 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A. 1.4: Generator Data
No. Busbar Resistance (pu) Reactance (pu)
1 BIR-01 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01732
2 CAP-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01154
3 CAP-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01154
4 DAI-01 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00787
5 DIN-02 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
6 DIN-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
7 DIN-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
8 DIN-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
9 DIN-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
1 0 DIN-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.06545
1 1 FFE-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.16011
1 2 FFE-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.16011
13 FRO-01 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.01732
14 TRA-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.17937
15 TRA-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.17937
16 TRA-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.17995
17 TRA-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.16483
18 WYL-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09228
19 WYL-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09429
2 0 WYL-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09129
2 1 WYL-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.09033
2 2 LEG-01 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00962
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Table A.2.1: Busbar Load Flow Data








1 CAP-01 1.00958 3.17329 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
2 CAP-02 1.01045 3.46748 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
3 CAP-03 1.01038 3.60525 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
4 CAP-06 1.00688 4.76539 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
5 CAP-07 .98496 -.64054 108.5000 22.6350
6 CAP-08 .98539 -.51949 108.5000 22.8779
7 DEE-01 1.00916 2.94338 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
8 DEE-02 .99746 -2.38993 228.6588 17.8877
9 DIN-01 1.02936 6.60513 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
1 0 FFE-01 1.01691 5.65566 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
1 1 FRO-02 1.00608 5.27272 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
1 2 LEG-02 .98665 -3.46812 311.0000 59.2415
13 PEN-01 1.02864 6.29256 0 . 0 0 0 0 60.0001
14 PEN-02 1.02369 3.41991 127.0558 9.0137
15 TRA-01 1.01909 4.27055 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
16 TRA-02 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
17 TRA-03 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
18 WYL-01 1.02934 7.15359 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
19 WYL-02 1.02375 1.91398 329.4420 4.5129
2 0 BIR-01 1.01095 3.77968 -48.0775 -1.1556
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Table A.2.1: Busbar Load Flow Data cont...








2 1 CAP-04 1.00892 4.69867 -378.0001 -61.0000
2 2 CAP-05 1.02096 6.49081 -341.5375 -72.0851
23 DAI-01 .990511 .37635 508.6049 286.2596
24 DIN-02 1.01731 13.35196 -238.5864 9.7273
25 DIN-03 1.01734 13.30837 -238.5864 9.9091
26 DIN-04 1.01734 13.30837 -238.5864 9.9091
27 DIN-05 1.01734 13.30837 -238.5864 9.9091
28 DIN-06 1.02936 6.60513 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
29 DIN-07 1.02936 6.60513 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
30 FFE-02 1.00711 12.86977 -131.0768 1.8111
31 FFE-03 1.00713 12.78757 -131.0768 1.9992
32 FRO-01 1.00608 5.27272 -137.0876 24.5947
33 TRA-04 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
34 TRA-05 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
35 TRA-06 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
36 TRA-07 1.01631 5.43239 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
37 WYL-03 1.03420 12.71137 -215.0000 -20.9186
38 WYL-04 1.03096 10.36284 -215.0000 -12.0538
39 WYL-05 1.03411 12.66068 -215.0000 -20.7265
40 WYL-06 1.03096 10.36284 -215.0000 -12.0538
41 LEG-01 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 1238.0000 45.9996
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1 LEG-01 DEE-01 -1025.034 -57.143 1030.510 94.673
2 LEG-01 TRA-01 -524.020 -67.941 529.084 62.883
3 DEE-01 PEN-01 -459.001 -128.117 461.061 101.505
4 DEE-01 PEN-01 -459.001 -128.117 461.061 101.505
5 DEE-01 CAP-01 -209.000 -10.009 209.060 2.863
6 DEE-01 CAP-02 -478.000 -34.010 478.315 30.426
7 DEE-01 TRA-01 -165.149 -67.943 165.691 24.619
8 DEE-01 DAI-01 255.374 116.953 -254.186 -143.095
9 DEE-01 DAI-01 255.608 117.051 -254.418 -143.165
1 0 PEN-01 TRA-01 434.816 -5.388 -432.912 -125.500
1 1 PEN-01 DIN-01 -536.883 -165.011 537.075 -98.336
1 2 PEN-01 DIN-01 -417.110 -100.040 417.275 -54.144
13 PEN-01 WYL-01 -265.002 -4.006 265.281 -17.368
14 PEN-01 WYL-01 -265.002 -4.006 265.281 -17.368
15 TRA-02 FFE-01 -130.932 16.055 131.077 -18.670
16 TRA-02 FFE-01 -130.932 16.537 131.077 -18.187
17 BIR-01 CAP-03 48.077 1.156 -48.060 -5.224
18 FRO-01 CAP-06 137.088 -24.594 -137.000 19.813
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1 LEG-01 LEG-02 311.000 79.000 -311.000 -59.242
2 DEE-01 DEE-02 114.329 19.760 -114.329 -8.944
3 DEE-01 DEE-02 114.329 19.760 -114.329 -8.944
4 PEN-01 PEN-02 63.639 7.736 -63.639 -4.515
5 PEN-01 PEN-02 63.417 7.709 -63.417 -4.499
6 TRA-01 TRA-02 -126.122 18.301 126.122 -15.697
7 TRA-01 TRA-02 -135.742 19.697 135.742 -16.895
8 TRA-02 TRA-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
9 TRA-02 TRA-03 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
1 0 TRA-02 TRA-04 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
1 1 TRA-02 TRA-05 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
1 2 TRA-02 TRA-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
13 TRA-02 TRA-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
14 FFE-01 FFE-02 -131.077 18.428 131.077 -1.805
15 FFE-01 FFE-03 -131.077 18.428 131.077 -1.994
16 DIN-01 DIN-02 -238.588 38.120 238.588 -9.713
17 DIN-01 DIN-03 -238.588 38.120 238.588 -9.895
18 DIN-01 DIN-04 -238.588 38.120 238.588 -9.895
19 DIN-01 DIN-05 -238.588 38.120 238.588 -9.895
2 0 DIN-01 DIN-06 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
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2 1 DIN-01 DIN-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
2 2 WYL-01 WYL-03 -215.001 -0 . 0 1 0 215.001 20.929
23 WYL-01 WYL-04 -215.000 -0.005 215.000 12.060
24 WYL-01 WYL-05 -215.001 -0.009 215.001 20.737
25 WYL-01 WYL-06 -215.000 -0.005 215.000 12.060
26 WYL-01 WYL-02 112.007 11.820 -112.007 -1.535
27 WYL-01 WYL-02 111.424 11.759 -111.424 -1.527
28 WYL-01 WYL-02 106.010 11.187 -106.010 -1.452
29 CAP-01 CAP-03 -48.060 -4.858 48.060 5.224
30 CAP-01 CAP-04 -161.000 1.994 161.000 -5.854
31 CAP-02 CAP-06 -137.000 22.992 137.000 -19.813
32 CAP-04 CAP-07 108.500 33.426 -108.500 -22.635
33 CAP-04 CAP-08 108.500 33.430 -108.500 -22.878
34 CAP-05 CAP-07 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
35 CAP-05 CAP-08 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
36 CAP-05 CAP-08 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
37 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
38 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
39 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
40 FRO-01 FRO-02 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
41 CAP-02 CAP-05 -341.315 -53.419 341.537 72.086
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APPENDIX B
THE INFLUENCE OF NETWORK CONDITIONS ON THE MEASURED 
IMPEDANCE BY DISTANCE RELAYS FOR SINGLE PHASE TO EARTH
FAULTS
Consider the power system network o f Fig.6.1. The impedances either side o f the fault 
point may be expressed, in sequence form, as:
(B.l)
(B.2)
■ Z tn l + (B.3)
(B.4)
Prior to the fault, the pre-fault a-phase load current flowing in the network, 1 ^ , is given
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and the pre-fault voltage at the fault point is given by:
Uy, = Eml - 1 ^ 2 ^  (B.6 )
The total impedance looking into the network at the fault point is given by:
ry ZM0ZN0
£  ■ 7 + Z  -  + 7 + 7 <B-7)
M l N1 MO NO
When a fault occurs on the system with resistance Rf the sequence fault currents are given 
by:
The total fault current is given by:
The sequence currents from M to F are dependent on the sequence component 
distribution factors. Thus:
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I  = I  = c I  = 
m  U2 ' *  Zr+a.R.
and
7 = c I  =* M 0  ^0 uf0
where:
N1
^M J  +  ZN}
"NO
^M O  +  2 NO
(B.12)
(B.13)
Thus, the a-phase current flowing in the faulted network is given by:
* u m L D l + ^  ~  I  L D l + ^M1 + + 7,'M 2 MO (B.14)
Now:
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3JiJf
-  a Z u + J +K J  (B.15)
res res
Substitution of equations (B.6) and (B.14) into equation (B.15) yields:
z  - « Z  Z£  * 3JV (B-16)
*  * U ,  +  ^ 2  +  *  K r . J r . ,
Simplifying:
3JC
Z  m easured  = Z l l  + z y  + 3-K (B.17)
—  V r m  +  + +  + K J  1»» | LDJ M J M 2  mO res res]
a
Substitution of equations (B.10) and (B.11) into equation (B.17) and simplifying gives:
3 R
Z m easured ~  a Z U  + z y  + 3JL (B.18)
- L -  r-Jwl * 2.c, ♦ c ,(  1 + 3 . K J
fl
Substitution of equation (B .6) into equation (B.18) gives:
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3 Rf
Zm»asur*d ~ a ^ ll +
E - I  Iml LDJ M1
Eliminating 1 ^  from equation (B.19) by substitution o f equation (B.5) and simplifying 
yields:
3 Jl
^m iasu rtd  =  a ^ U  +
%  -  ^  ~ + 2  + , + 3X  (B.20)
E .2 * E ..Zu . 1 0 1  r" !m l N1 n l M l
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APPENDIX C
TRANSMISSION LINE PARAMETERS
Table C .l: Parameters for a 1 0 0  km, 400 kV Transmission Line
Parameter Quantity
Positive Phase Sequence Resistance (0  / km) 0.0175
Positive Phase Sequence Reactance (Q / km) 0.31
Zero Phase Sequence Resistance (Q / km) 0.1060
Zero Phase Sequence Reactance(Q / km) 0 . 8 8
Line Length (km) 1 0 0 . 0
Nominal Voltage (kV) 400.0
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APPENDIX D
POWER SYSTEM PARAMETERS FOR ILLUSTRATING THE INFLUENCE 
OF OPERATING CONDITIONS ON MEASURED IMPEDANCE
The table below highlights the operating conditions used for demonstrating the influence 
of different parameters on the measured impedance. In each case, where a parameter is 
varied, the associated parameter in the table should be ignored.
Table D. 1: Power System Parameters
Parameter Quantity
Capacity o f Source M (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio of Source M: 30.0
Zsm0 to Z8ml Ratio of Source M: 1.5
Real Voltage of Source M (kV): 400.0
Reactive Voltage of Source M  (kV): 0.0
Capacity o f Source N (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio o f Source N: 30.0
Z8m0 to Zsml Ratio of Source N: 1.5
Real Voltage of Source N (kV): 400.0
Reactive Voltage of Source N (kV): 0.0
Fault Resistance Range (Q): 0.0 - 300.0
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APPENDIX E
POWER SYSTEM PARAMETERS WITH CONDITIONS OF PRE-FAULT 
IMPORTING LOAD AT RELAYING POINT
Table E. 1: Power System Parameters with Load Flowing from N to M
Parameter Quantity
Capacity o f Source M (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio of Source M: 30.0
Zsm0 to Ztml Ratio o f Source M: 1.5
Real Voltage of Source M  (kV): 410.0
Reactive Voltage of Source M (kV): -90.0
Capacity o f Source N (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio of Source N: 30.0
Zim0 to Ziml Ratio of Source N: 1.5
Real Voltage of Source N (kV): 400.0
Reactive Voltage of Source N (kV): 0.0
Fault Resistance Range (Q): 0.0-55.0
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APPENDIX F
POWER SYSTEM PARAMETERS WITH CONDITIONS OF PRE-FAULT 
EXPORTING LOAD AT RELAYING POINT
Table F. 1: Power System Parameters with Load Flowing from M to N
Parameter Quantity
Capacity o f Source M (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio o f Source M: 30.0
Zim0 to Zgml Ratio of Source M: 1.5
Real Voltage o f Source M (kV): 400.0
Reactive Voltage of Source M (kV): 0.0
Capacity o f Source N (GVA): 20.0
X to R Ratio of Source N: 30.0
Zsmo to Z,ml Ratio of Source N: 1.5
Real Voltage of Source N (kV): 410.0
Reactive Voltage of Source N (kV): -90.0
Fault Resistance Range (Q): 0.0 - 100.0
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